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Abstract 
         Looking across the 20th century, this thesis seeks to understand the 
relationship African Americans developed between automobility and the fight for 
civil rights, filling a gap left in the historiography of both the automobile and the 
Civil Rights Movement. Historians of the automobile have almost exclusively focused 
their lens on white suburbia and the “autotopias” that Americans created, while 
historians of the Civil Rights Movement ignored the automobile entirely. This thesis 
hopes to begin to fill that void by explaining how African Americans exploited the 
technological system of the automobile to create forms of transportation accessible 
to African American communities, yet separate from segregated public 
transportation systems. African Americans used the automobile to repeatedly 
undermine white authority that dominated the spaces of public transportation. 
African Americans were not absent from the story of the automobile rather the 
transformative technological system was perhaps more powerful from African 
Americans than any other group of people. They actively used cars to change the 
rules that governed legal and social interaction between themselves and whites.   
        Almost as soon as the automobile was invented, African Americans used the 
technological system to assert power for themselves and developed transportation 
options and corporations aimed at giving African American options not governed by 
White Authority. The first of these options was the exploitation of jitney buses 
(automobiles outfitted for maximum passenger capacity) to challenge the 
segregated streetcars that dominated urban transportation in the early 1900s. 
 
 
 
 
 
vi 
        African Americans also gained agency and power through the pooling of 
resources, particularly in the form of a carpool that financially crippled the 
Montgomery public bus company and forced segregation into a national 
conversation on the tails of the Brown v. Board decision and became one of the first 
applications of law that tested the Supreme Court’s stance on segregation. 
        African American history and the story of the automobile are not mutually 
exclusive, rather are intricately connected. This connection can be ignored no 
longer.  
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Introduction 
This study examines the historical relationship between power, race, and 
technology through a study of African Americans’ use of automobiles to combat 
segregation in public transportation—and by extension public space—during the 
first half of the twentieth century. The rise of segregation in the 1880s was not 
inevitable. It was a system built from active choices aimed at re-cementing African 
Americans into second-class status following the gains of Reconstruction.1 Whites 
wrote and voted segregation laws into city codes and state constitutions, helping to 
create what many southerners called, “the Southern way.”2 White supremacy 
however was not limited to the South and dominated the political and social order 
of major swaths of the United States.3 Whites dictated where African Americans 
could and could not reside, shop, eat, worship and even school their children. 
Whites could move freely through the resulting black-dominated communities 
without facing legal or violent retaliation while African Americans faced arrest, 
physical abuse, or death should they enter spaces deemed white only. However, 
with the rise of Jim Crow, came resistance to the laws of segregation. African 
Americans organized opposition, often pooling resources from a network of people 
that spanned across class, age, and gender. 4  They took steps to challenge 
                                                        
1 This is not to say that Reconstruction was a success, but certainly African Americans for a short 
period gained constitutional rights, ones for which they would and still continue to fight. 
2 J.R. Robinson Sr. to Montgomery City Bus Lines, March 14, 1956, J.H. Bagley Papers, Alabama 
Department of Archives and History (ADAH), Montgomery, Alabama.  
3 Robert O. Self, American Babylon: Race and the Struggle for Postwar Oakland (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2005, 15. In this work Self explores the relationship of segregation in liberalism 
through his focus on control over space in Oakland, CA. Self explains that segregation, while not law, 
still dominated many aspects of social and lived space in cities outside of the South.  
4 An astute study of African Americans resource pooling can be found in Allison Calhoun-Brown, 
“African American Churches and Political Mobilization: The Psychological Impact of Organizational 
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segregation on every level; the battleground for resistance was just as likely to be 
found on city streets as it was to be found in courtrooms.5 Well documented by 
historians, successful resistance to segregation required African Americans to know 
and use the law.6 Yet in day-to-day encounters with segregation, as well as 
organized campaigns against it, African Americans took advantage of a powerful 
technological system in their resistance to and subversion of Jim Crow segregation, 
one that has come to define daily transportation across America: the automobile.7 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Resources,” The Journal of Politics 58, no. 4 (November, 1996), 945. In this study, Calhoun-Brown 
examines the networking and pooling of resources conducted through African American religious 
organizations, placing emphasis on churches as community centers for social and economic 
organization. 
5 Scholars have done a phenomenal job of documenting the diverse forms resistance to segregation. 
Paul Gilroy, “Driving While Black” in Car Cultures (New York: Berg, 2001) specifically ties the 
automobile to resistance of segregation and other forms of white power and argues this resistance is 
a contributing factor to the reason that African Americans make up 30% of those who purchase 
automobiles but only make up 12% of the population.  Resistance to streetcar segregation is 
specifically analyzed in Blair Murphy Kelly, Right to Ride: Streetcar Boycotts and African American 
Citizenship in the Era of Plessy V. Ferguson (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010); 
Edward L. Ayers, The Promise of the New South: Life After Reconstruction (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1992); Neil R. McMillen, Dark Journey: Black Mississippians in the Age of Jim Crow 
(Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1989); August Meier and Elliott Rudwick’s, "The Boycott 
Movement against Jim Crow Streetcars in the South, 1900-1906," The Journal of American History 55, 
no.4 (March 1969): 756-775; Ross D. Eckert and George W. Hilton, “The Jitneys,” Journal of Law and 
Economics 15, no. 2 (October 1972): 293-325 which demonstrate the creativity and resourcefulness 
that African Americans brought to the fight against streetcar segregation. A fantastic introduction to 
the various forms of resistance that African Americans utilized in the struggle for civil rights can be 
gained from John Hope Franklin and Evelyn Higginbotham, From Slavery to Freedom: The Story of 
African Americans, 9th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2010) which is a helpful reference to any 
historian studying African American history. 
6 The role of the legal system in the struggle for civil rights is beyond extensive. Historical works that 
document this relationship are Glenn Feldman eds., Before Brown: Civil Rights and White Backlash in 
the Modern South (Tuscaloosa, AL: The University of Alabama Press, 2004; Richard Kluger, Simple 
Justice: The History of Brown v. Board of Education and Black America’s Struggle for Equality (New 
York: Random House inc., 2004); Mark V. Tushnet, Making Civil Rights Law: Thurgood Marshall and 
the Supreme Court, 1936-1961 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); Alexander Tsesis, We Shall 
Overcome: A history of Civil Rights and the Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007); Herman 
Mason Jr., Politics, Civil Rights and Law in Black Atlanta, 1870-1970 (Charleston, SC: Arcadia 
Publishing, 2000);  Burt M. Reiff, “Browder v. Gale: The Legal Vehicle of the Montgomery Bus 
Boycott,” Alabama Review 41, no.1 (Spring 1998): 193-208; Robert Jerome Glennon, “The Role of Law 
in the Civil Rights Movement,” Law and History Review 9, no. 2 (1991): 59-112. 
7 One of the pioneering works in regards to the analysis of physical artifacts is Langdon Winner, “Do 
Artifacts have politics?,” Daedalus 109, no. 1 (Winter, 1980): 121-136 in which Winner demonstrates 
how African Americans were the victims of power gained through technology and the ways in which 
3 
 
 
 
 
Historians have largely focused their attention regarding the automobile on white 
motorists, white car culture, and on white flight to suburban “autotopias.” However 
recent scholarship has begun to stray away from this problematic schema, providing 
more attention to minorities and their cars.8 For decades, the automobile served as 
a powerful tool in the fight against segregation. Black automobility threatened white 
control over space, one of the core sources of power underpinning Jim Crow 
segregation. However, African Americans’ challenge to Jim Crow in the form of black 
automobility came with limitations. Cars could not ensure success or safety. The 
automobile could not help James Chaney, Andrew Goodman, and Michael Schwerner 
the night the Ku Klux Klan ripped them from their car and murdered the three 
                                                                                                                                                                     
technology limited the abilities and agency of African Americans but as Rayvon Fouché, “Say it Loud, 
I’m Black and I’m Proud: African Americans, American Artifactual Culture, and Black Vernacular 
Technological Creativity,” American Quarterly 58, no. 3 (September 2006): 639-661 points out, 
African Americans also gained agency and power through the use of technology and the automobile 
was one of the systems that African Americans successfully utilized in efforts to mitigate and 
circumvent white supremacy as manifested in Jim Crow laws. 
8 There is deep historiography on minority car culture that historians have developed in the past 
fifteen years and a good introduction can be found in Paul Gilroy, “Driving While Black” in Daniel 
Miller eds., Car Cultures (New York: Berg, 2001) in which Gilroy searches for an understanding to 
why African-Americans make up a disproportionate number of car owners in the United States. 
Gilroy briefly explains that historians can no longer ignore the automobile as an important 
technological system in the lives of African Americans, and challenges historians particularly in the 
field of vernacular history to look closer at cars in black culture.  Five years after the publication of 
Gilroy’s challenge Rayvon Fouché began to address similar themes. In Rayvon Fouché, “Say it Loud, 
I’m Black and I’m Proud: African Americans, American Artifactual Culture, and Black Vernacular 
Technological Creativity” American Quarterly 58, no. 3 (September 2006): 639-661 Fouché focuses 
his lens on African American technological culture, and while he does not specifically focus on the 
automobile, he begins the process of understanding the ways and language in which African 
Americans and African American communities have thought and expressed their thoughts about 
artifacts of technology. Ben Chappell, Lowrider Space: Aesthetics and Politics of Mexican American 
Custom Cars (Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 2013) applies exactly what Gilroy called for in 
regard to African Americans to the culture of Latino Americans particularly in the custom lowriders 
that, as Chappell argues erect images of gangsters in the minds of white, middle class Americans. 
Chappell analyses the interaction between lowriders and both physical and audiological space, as 
well as a host of historical factors leading to their proliferation in certain Mexican American 
communities. 
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young men.9 Yet for more than half a century, African Americans gained power, 
mobility, and authority over space through the use of the technological system of the 
automobile as a means of challenging Jim Crow segregation. 
The study that follows began as an investigation into how African Americans 
used the automobile to challenge segregation during the seminal yearlong boycott of 
buses in 1956 Montgomery and evolved into a much larger story. This study’s scope 
spans the first half of the 20th century, and focuses on African Americans’ sustained 
use of automobile technology to challenge the segregation of public 
transportation—including streetcar lines and buses—that treated them as second-
class citizens. Through the exploitation of a growing web of automobile technology 
African Americans fought Jim Crow transportation demanding better for themselves 
and their communities. Some of the most significant gains of power, mobility, and 
authority over space were made following this exploitation, and it is in this context 
that this study seeks to complicate familiar stories, looking at the challenge for Civil 
Rights through the lenses of spatial and technological history.   
Power, mobility, and authority are loaded and ambiguous terms, so it is 
important to discuss their direct meaning as they pertain to this study. Power is 
used throughout this study in the context of Anthony Giddens’ structuration theory. 
Giddens’ theory is well summarized by historian Kevin Borg who explains that, 
“Structuration, in Giddens’ use of the term is a process: the ongoing, dynamic use, 
                                                        
9 Claude Sitton, “Experts Identify Mississippi Bodies as Rights Aides’,” New York Times, August 6, 
1964 http://www.nytimes.com/1964/08/06/experts-identify-mississippi-bodies-as-rights-
aides.html (accessed April 8, 2015) 
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reproduction, and mutation of tacit rules of routine social interaction.”10 In this way, 
white supremacy became the implicit rules that dominated social interactions 
between whites and African Americans, and power can be understood as the ability 
to reinforce or to challenge the rules of those interactions. Resources of power can 
be used to change structures and relationships.  Subversive power can be 
understood as the ability to upset even a small part of the social rules of white 
supremacy. African Americans gained such power through a variety of means 
ranging from writings letters demanding that streetcar operators curb their abusive 
behavior, to organizing massive boycotts designed to force the integration of city 
buses. Each draws on different resources of power: from language and discourse to 
technology and money.  
While power is a term that historians use with regularity, the study of 
mobility is a more recent development.11 Historians predominately utilize mobility 
to explain movement through and between social classes, however in the context of 
African Americans’ struggle against segregation, mobility should be understood as 
the ability to navigate through contested space. Studying automobility can thus do 
more than document the rise of a suburban nation by specifically analyzing mobility 
through, or within, contested space. Space in turn is best defined in the context of 
Michel Foucault’s discussions on heterotopia. Foucault explained that space can be 
conceived as, “a set of relations” inherently tied to geographic concepts of physical 
                                                        
10 For a discussion on the usefulness to historians of Giddens’ structuration theory and an example of 
such theory applied to a study regarding both race, technology, and the linking of social control and 
space see Kevin Borg, “The ‘Chauffer Problem’ in the Early Auto Era: Structuration Theory and the 
Users of Technology,” Technology and Culture 40, no. 4 (October, 1999): 797-832.  
11 One indication of this is the 2000 launch of Transfers: Interdisciplinary Journal of Mobility Studies. 
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space. The differences in space are laid out by Henri Lefebrve who established three 
categorical distinctions regarding space: physical space as perceived space, mental 
space as conceived space, and social space as lived space.12 In places and spaces 
examined in the following study, the three categories collide. Physical space can be 
found on the seats of buses, on the roads of cities, and in the pews of churches but 
become social space with the introduction of human agents, while simultaneously 
following the rules of mental space. The structuration of such spaces in this study is 
understood as the dynamic interaction of actors employing differing resources of 
power and authority over the lived spaces of black and white urban mobility. Those 
who create the rules of the mental space within these physical and social spaces 
hold the authority and thus dominate power by defining interactions within those 
spaces, until met by novel applications of countervailing resources.  
Racial segregation violated the basic idea of an inherent right granted by the 
U. S. Constitution. Habeas corpus, literally translating from Latin to “that you have 
the body,” typically was and is legally applied to detainment and imprisonment. But 
its basic meaning falls upon the freedom of movement, of mobility.13 By denying 
African Americans the right to move freely through spaces, those who championed 
segregation deprived African Americans of habeas corpus. In the system of 
segregation, African Americans held no authority over their own bodies. Rather 
their bodies were subjected to white authority. Much like in antebellum slavery, 
                                                        
12 Both Foucault’s definition of space and Henri Lefebvre’s conceptions of space are gleaned from 
Miriam Kahn, “Tahiti Intertwined: Ancestral Land, Tourist Postcard, and Nuclear Test Site,” American 
Anthropologist 102, no.1 (March 2000): 7-26. 
13 Wex Legal Dictionary, Legal Information Institute, Cornell University Law School 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/habeas_corpus (accessed April 1, 2015) 
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whites dictated the spaces acceptable for the movement and residence of black 
bodies. That Jim Crow segregation arose in the 1870s and took hold in the 1890s is 
largely uncontested, but the question of why segregation took a firm grip over city 
and state politics remains hotly debated. It seems directly counter to the rules of 
slavery, in which slaves often worked alongside their masters, and lived in close 
proximity to whites, and historians have struggled to explain and understand how 
such a change took place in the late nineteenth century. 
C. Vann Woodward was one of the first historians to tackle the issue, and his 
1954 work, The Strange Career of Jim Crow, laid out reasons and ways that 
segregation took hold of the South. Woodward contended that segregation 
developed gradually and primarily through social attitudes that sought to unify 
white southerners. Social attitudes pitted whites against African Americans and in 
turn the goal of whites became to separate themselves from African Americans. 
Woodward argued that southern whites saw Reconstruction as a disruption to 
otherwise normal relations between the races, and that it was only when the 
“carpetbaggers” left the South that race relations returned to their natural state. The 
question then remained: why did segregation, a system that did not exist under 
slavery, take such a strong hold of southern race relations? Woodward agreed that 
segregation during slavery was “impractical” and that the establishment of 
segregation was not a restoration of race relations following Reconstruction but 
rather a new establishment that used the same hierarchical structure.14 
                                                        
14 W C. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow (New York: Oxford University Press, 1955) 
13-14. 
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 Woodward argued that segregation began gradually, first occurring in 
Protestant churches through, “the voluntary withdrawal of the Negroes and their 
establishment of independent organizations of their own.”15 This line of thinking 
seems to hold water. African Americans likely did not view their former masters as 
friendly neighbors with whom they wanted to share their life experiences. After 
being forced to work and live in close proximity to those who withheld freedom and 
human rights, African Americans opted out, and physically removed themselves 
from some the spaces shared by whites. Woodward further argued that segregation 
of public schools was created during Reconstruction as a means of educating African 
Americans, and constructing a system in which they would have a sense of safety. 
Furthermore the segregation of military units in the Civil War did not vanish, but 
rather became the model that the armed forces would rely upon for over eighty 
years. However, despite these first early instances of segregation, Jim Crowism did 
not take the south by storm. On the contrary, many southerners held philosophies 
regarding race relations that often strongly opposed segregation. These practices 
often included remnants of paternalistic ideology, placing whites as the custodians 
of African Americans, and “burdened” whites with the responsibility of pulling 
African Americans up and out of slavery and into their modern ideal of civil rights. 
Woodward was quick to point out that while some origins of segregation can be 
found in the Reconstruction period, the South developed the policies of segregation-
as-law decades after Reconstruction, and while racism reigned supreme, 
                                                        
15 Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow, 15. 
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segregation was not the immediate answer for the South. But how then did Jim Crow 
become universal law?16 
Woodward explains, “all the elements of fear, jealousy, proscription, hatred 
and fanaticism had long been present. . . . What enabled them [whites] to rise to 
dominance was not so much cleverness or ingenuity as it was a general weakening 
and discrediting of the numerous forces that had hitherto kept them in check.”17 
According to Woodward, African Americans’ civil rights were chipped away rather 
than being revoked all at once. Prior to segregation came disenfranchisement. 
Woodward then explains that following disenfranchisement came physical attacks 
on African Americans as mob violence in the form of riots and lynching became 
common practice within the South.18 It was only then that segregation was allowed 
to take hold in the South, gradually moving from state to state, and according to 
Woodward, the older states such as Virginia and South Carolina were the last to 
adopt segregation as law, whereas newer states such as Mississippi began to call for 
Jim Crow segregation in the 1880s.19 
Woodward is not the only historian to adopt this view of the rise of 
segregation. In The Promise of the New South: Life After Reconstruction, Edward L. 
Ayers states that, “segregation begun in the decade following the end of the Civil 
War did not spread inexorably and evenly across the face of the South. The 1880s 
                                                        
16 Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow, 13-15; 19-33; 47. 
17 Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow, 51. 
18 Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow, 71. It is important to note here that lynching was not 
confined to the South but rather became prominent across the United States predominantly targeting 
African Americans as well as Mexican Americans, migrant workers and Latino immigrants.  
19 Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow, 79. 
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saw much uncertainty and much bargaining, many forays and retreats.”20 Ayers is in 
agreement with Woodward. Both see segregation as beginning during 
Reconstruction but evolving through the 1880s and 1890s taking hold in the latter 
part. Both agree that it was social anxieties and behaviors that led to Jim Crow 
segregation. Ayers describes more specifically how segregation took place and for 
Ayers transportation was key. Railways were the first to see segregation laws 
because they were unavoidable physical spaces of black and white interaction. 
Ayers explains, “While some blacks resisted their exclusion from white-owned 
hotels and restaurants, they could find and often preferred accommodations in 
black-run businesses. Travel was a different story, for members of both races had no 
choice but to use the same railroads. . . . By all accounts, the railroads of the 1880s 
were contested terrain.”21 Ayers correctly identifies railways as a different sphere of 
segregation, and I hope to extend that argument to the streetcars and buses, with 
automobiles as the primary tool used to combat segregation within those physical 
spaces.  While Woodward laid out the map and path of Jim Crow segregation, he 
failed to explain why segregation specifically took hold. Ayers filled that gap, arguing 
that segregation as a social practice evolved into law when it became inconvenient 
or impossible for segregation to take place in certain spaces. Economic efficiencies 
of particular forms of transportation including railroads, streetcars, and later buses 
constrained the voluntary removal of African Americans from spaces aboard public 
transportation shared by whites and vice versa.  What Ayers does not note however 
                                                        
20 Ayers, The Promise of the New South, 135. 
21 Ayers, The Promise of the New South, 137. 
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is that segregation was not desired by all or even necessarily a majority of whites, 
rather the possibility for some whites to segregate themselves from African 
Americans was seen as a necessity. Since some whites desired to be segregated from 
African Americans, they demanded the ability to do so, an ability that did not 
informally occur on railroads, or streetcars, which were new spaces of the post Civil 
War generation. Once segregated, these spaces would serve as models to transfer 
spatial rules to the buses that came later. 
 Federal segregation developed not long after the establishment of 
segregation on railways and streetcars, and unsurprisingly, it was the use of these 
transportation technologies that brought forth the first Supreme Court ruling 
dealing with segregation.  Plessy v. Ferguson stemmed from Homer A. Plessy’s 
attempt to ban segregation laws from railroads, however the ruling instead gave 
federal backing to the state and city laws that established segregation as the 
dominant spatial rule on public transportation. The Court’s reasoning was also then 
extended to other public spaces, leading to a legally segregated south.22 
The first use of automobiles to resist segregation came as whites linked the 
racialized system of Jim Crow to urban streetcar lines. Streetcars did not just 
happen to become segregated. As streetcar companies sought to downsize their 
larger cars, adopting smaller cars known as “one-man cars” or “safety cars.” These 
cars were more cost effective as they allowed the streetcar to be operated by one 
driver, and thus companies saved money. However the cars also contained less 
interior space and fewer seats, requiring closer proximity of passengers. White 
                                                        
22 Homer Adolph Plessy v. John H. Ferguson. 
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passengers voiced increased concern about sitting close to black passengers, and 
even more concern about the fact that the “safety cars” were constructed with only 
one door. This meant that African American patrons would use the same entrance as 
white patrons, increasing interaction even more.23  These concerns inspired more 
permanent fixtures of segregation to be built onto the streetcars in the forms of 
signs denoting black and white seats. This is the system that stirred African 
Americans’ strongest resistance, as mechanized transportation had become 
necessary to urban life in many major cities by the turn of the twentieth century.  
African Americans in cities across the south enacted boycotts against the 
streetcars and used modified automobiles known as “jitneys” as substitutes to the 
streetcars. 24 Jitney companies offered customers rides in automobiles retrofitted to 
hold the maximum number of passengers. The jitneys were a fairly successful 
technological system regardless of whether passengers and drivers alike used them 
to challenge segregation, or provide passengers of any race with a more direct, less 
crowded, and more private means to their destination. Yet under the guise of public 
safety they were largely done away with. Whites created laws that regulated jitneys 
to the point of virtually outlawing them. Nonetheless for the time that jitneys were 
used to circumvent segregated streetcars, African Americans empowered 
themselves, and also injected money into black businesses. The new technology of 
                                                        
23 “Birmingham’s Race Problem: Company Will Try Out Twenty-Five One-Man Cars Using New 
Equipment for Segregation” Electrical Railway Journal 54, no. 22 (1919), 1064. 
24 These augmented automobiles came to be known as “jitneys” as they typically charged a nickel, 
colloquially termed a jitney, for each ride. It is not truly clear whether the buses or nickels were first 
called jitneys. Multiple etymology dictionaries bring up this contention, but typically side with the 
idea that the buses acquired the name from the coin.  Douglas Harper, “jitney” Online Etymology 
Dictionary, 2014 http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=jitney (accessed April 6, 2015) 
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the automobile—in particular its rail-free mobility and relative inexpense—injected 
new resources that African American reformers employed to challenge the system 
of segregation. African Americans used jitney buses to offer black passengers spaces 
free of legal segregation, and provided a cheap means to escape the streetcars. 
While the black jitney companies were almost entirely done away with in the wake 
of increased regulation—a result of countervailing mobilization of resources by 
whites—it was not the last time black resistance to segregation used the automobile 
as a tool of mobility and power in the fight for civil rights. But for the time being 
racial segregation of passenger space on public transportation was established and 
cemented on the streetcars and in the stations.25  
By the middle decades of the century, many cities replaced streetcars with 
buses. When faced with physical abuses and segregation on public bus lines, African 
Americans in Montgomery, Alabama started the Montgomery Bus Boycott using the 
car as a tool to subvert segregated public transportation. Beginning in 1955 and 
lasting an entire year, the black citizens of Montgomery organized and ran a carpool 
that employed over 400 cars with hundreds of drivers transporting thousands of 
passengers.26 This was a much larger and more concentrated effort than any of the 
individual jitney lines that were launched in scattered southern cities in the early 
                                                        
25 The intersection between race and automobility has not been completely ignored. An introduction 
to this can be found in Paul Gilroy, “Driving While Black” in Daniel Miller eds., Car Cultures (New 
York: Berg, 2001); Kathleen Franz, “The Open Road: Automobility and Racial Uplift in the Interwar 
Years” in Bruce Sinclair eds., Technology and the African American Experience: Needs and Opportunity 
for Study (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004; Rayvon Fouché, “Say it Loud, I’m Black and I’m Proud: 
African Americans, American Artifactual Culture, and Black Vernacular Technological Creativity” 
American Quarterly 58, no. 3 (September 2006): 639-661; Ben Chappell, Lowrider Space: Aesthetics 
and Politics of Mexican American Custom Cars (Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 2013) 
26 Xavier Macy, Montgomery Bus Boycott Carpool Database (MBBCD) in this database in which 
hundreds of cars are listed from data collected from police reports filed by police and supplemented 
by city directories to fill gaps left by police such as the race and sex of the driver.   
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1900s. In Montgomery the carpool was the most important element of the boycott; 
without it the boycott would not have succeeded. African Americans used the 
carpool to provide Montgomery’s black population with a viable substitute to the 
segregated buses, which like the streetcars in the early 1900s, were necessary to 
daily life. Every day, the boycotters piled cars full of black passengers and traveled 
to over thirty different stops around the city. Police officers followed close behind, 
harassing the boycotters through traffic stops, tickets, and arrests. The police 
mounted a surveillance campaign against the boycott, and dedicated their resources 
to forcing African Americans out of the cars of the carpool and back onto the buses 
controlled by whites. African Americans’ pooled their knowledge and financial, legal, 
and social resources, thereby keeping the boycotters one step ahead of the police. 
The modus operandi for police during the boycott was constant inspection of 
African American motorists, yet simultaneously the same African American drivers 
provided authorities with prepared answers that kept the carpool within the 
framework of existing Montgomery laws.  
While this study does not focus solely on the Montgomery Bus Boycott, a 
discussion of the historiography pertaining to the boycott is required. Too often has 
the assumption been that everything has been written about the boycott, when in 
reality there is still much to learn about this seemingly familiar story. The 
boycotters played a formative role in challenging Jim Crow and thus they warrant 
sustained attention in order to understand how African Americans gained civil 
rights through the technological system of the automobile. 
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The Montgomery Bus Boycott has been heralded by historians as one of the 
most important events in the Civil Rights Movement. It has been seen by some as the 
first true beginning of the movement, and as the first leadership role of one of the 
most iconic figures in both the movement and United States history in general: 
Martin Luther King Jr.27 Despite all of this, historians have largely ignored the day-
to-day workings of the bus boycott, as there is not a single credible historical work 
dedicated to understanding the nuances of the critical year-long struggle. 
Furthermore, the carpool—the tool for mobility and empowerment, and the 
medium to most strongly challenge white supremacy—has rarely made an 
appearance in the historiography and has never benefited from any sustained 
analysis, especially regarding the interplay between race and technology.  
While the historiography lacks studies singularly devoted to the boycott, 
attention to the boycott can be found between the pages of many biographies and 
monographs dedicated to the Civil Rights Movement. The most successful of these 
include, King: A critical Biography by David Levering Lewis, Bearing the Cross: 
Martin Luther King Jr., and The Southern Christian Leadership Conference both by 
David J. Garrow, and of course Parting the Waters: America in the King Years: 1954-
1963 by the most prominent historian of Martin Luther King Jr., Taylor Branch.  
One work that describes the boycott in some detail comes from one of the 
boycotts leaders, Martin Luther King Jr. In his 1958 book, Stride Toward Freedom: 
The Montgomery Story, King gives a firsthand account of the boycott from the 
                                                        
27 Taylor Branch, Parting the Waters: America in the King Years 1954-1963 (New York: Simon & 
Schuster Inc., 1989, 78. 
16 
 
 
 
 
perspective of the MIA’s leader and the public face of the boycott.28 King recalled the 
carpool and the inner workings of the boycott just two years after its conclusion, 
leaving historians with an important and informative eyewitness account. Yet, 
lacking the perspective of time, it leaves many questions still unanswered. 
Coming only two years after King’s assassination, Lewis’ biography, King, 
provided one of the first critical approaches to Martin Luther King Jr., and unlike the 
few works prior was not solely created to praise the life and times of the iconic 
figure.29 King served as more than just a biography of the man that became and has 
remained the face of the Civil Rights Movement. Lewis also created a work that 
effectively analyzed the Martin Luther King Jr.’s leading role in many events of the 
Civil Rights Movement, not fearing to also examine some actions outside the King’s 
reach in order to provide necessary context.  
While Lewis’ inaugural work was a good beginning to understanding the 
Montgomery Bus Boycott and the Civil Rights Movement, it left historians with 
questions that needed more nuanced, analytical answers. Lewis acknowledged the 
existence and importance of the carpool during the bus boycott, but limited its 
significance to merely an option to walking and more a symbol than a foundational 
element in the boycott. Lewis argued, “Many people had chosen to walk to work to 
advertise their resolve, but they did not walk every day. Furthermore the car pool 
was symbolic of the boycotts success and efficiency . . . blacks knew they had the 
                                                        
28 Martin Luther King Jr., Stride Toward Freedom: The Montgomery Story (New York: Ballantine 
Books, 1958) 
29 David Lettering Lewis, King: A Critical Biography (New York: Allen Lane, 1970), 67. 
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option of riding in a spanking new MIA station wagon or a private citizen’s auto.”30 
While it is encouraging to find reference to the carpool, Lewis provided only a 
cursory understanding of the organized transportation system, with no reference to 
how the carpool was planned, operated, funded, run, or targeted by the police. Lewis 
did note that the city attempted to outlaw the carpools, but failed to explain how 
Montgomery officials set out to do so and never mentioned the organized police 
campaign against the carpool.31 Lewis also focused solely upon the leadership of the 
boycott. This is understandable considering the biographical lens of his study. While 
biographies can be useful for understanding certain individuals in history, the same 
strength gained through specificity of focus can also be a weakness in distorting the 
views of history presented. The boycott certainly needed leadership, but was born 
out of the participation and activism of Montgomery’s black community. Leaders 
would have been meaningless had the masses decided that the fight against Jim 
Crow was not worth it. And the challenge to segregation would have been fleeting if 
every boycotting black working in the city had had to walk every day. Without the 
African Americans of Montgomery, Martin Luther King Jr. may never have gained 
national prominence, and most assuredly the leaders of the Civil Rights Movement 
would be powerless without the masses of participants.  
Although Lewis’ biography of Martin Luther King Jr. was the first of its kind, 
it most certainly was not the last. Taylor Branch’s body of work on King is nothing 
short of astounding. Branch’s four works spanning the life of King are the essential 
                                                        
30 King: A Critical Biography, 78.  
31 This is likely because the sources that would speak to this police campaign have gone undiscovered 
by academia until now.  
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monographs used when examining King’s life and the Civil Rights Movement. 
Branch provides complex analysis of the events in which King played a major role, 
crafting a compelling narrative to draw in readers. Branch’s volumes on King are 
masterful, but Montgomery is relegated to Parting the Waters where it is largely 
used to introduce the young minister and mark his emergence as a leader.32 He does 
not provide much commentary on the carpool itself and, similar to Lewis, focuses 
more on the leadership of the boycott, particularly Martin Luther King Jr.33 The 
chapter dedicated to the Montgomery Bus Boycott paints a clear picture of the 
events associated with boycott, including the carpool. But again it fails to provide 
the carpool, or automobiles in general, with any sustained analysis and lacks the 
necessary sources to give any meaningful detail on the police campaign against the 
boycott. Thus it overlooks the power dynamics that shifted due to the automobile. 
This is unsurprising as Branch’s goal was not to examine understandings of power 
in the Montgomery Bus Boycott, but rather to show King’s role in the boycott and 
the Civil Rights Movement as a whole.  
Branch’s work came during an eruption of attention being paid to the Civil 
Rights Movement, and much of that attention fell upon Martin Luther King Jr. Two 
other historians, David Garrow and Adam Fairclough similarly focused on King, but 
did so in an effort to diminish King’s role in the Movement. As historian Richard H. 
King explains in his review of Branch’s work, “Their [Garrow and Fairclough] 
purpose lay more in minimizing the importance of King as a great leader and in 
                                                        
32 Taylor Branch, Parting the Waters: America in the King Years 1954-1963 (New York: Simon & 
Schuster Inc., 1989)  
33 Taylor Branch, 145. 
19 
 
 
 
 
underscoring the extent to which he was, as the Student Nonviolent Coordinating 
Committee (SNCC) mentor, Ella Baker, asserted, ‘Made by the Movement.’”34 Branch 
hoped to counter this view of King in Parting the Waters, instead placing King as 
“the best and most important metaphor for American history in the watershed 
postwar years.”35 This explains Branch’s focus on King throughout Parting the 
Waters, and his particular emphasis on King’s role in the bus boycott. While the 
question of King’s role in the Civil Rights Movement is an important one, the answer 
will not be found in this study which seeks instead to examine the relationship 
between power, race, and technology.  
The other two aforementioned authors’ works, while strong in their own 
right, give little attention to the carpool that made the bus boycott possible. 
Garrow’s Bearing the Cross and Fairclough’s To Redeem the Soul of America both 
mention the carpool, but similar to branch provide only a rough chronology and 
passing comments regarding the organized transportation without providing any 
analytical understandings. For Garrow and Fairclough, the carpool is an important 
facet of the boycott, but the power dynamics of the carpool go ignored. Furthermore, 
neither of the authors examines the police campaign against the carpool.36 While 
Garrow describes King being pulled over by the police, he attributes this to general 
                                                        
34 Richard H. King, “Review of Parting the Waters: America in the King Years, 1954-63 by Taylor 
Branch” The Journal of American History 70, no. 1 (June, 1990): 267, www.jstor.org 
35 Branch, Parting the Waters, xii. 
36 This is the standard treatment of the Montgomery Bus Boycott. Another biography, Jeanne 
Theoharis, The Rebellious Life of Mrs. Rosa Parks (Boston: Beacon Press, 2013) similarly gave details 
about the carpool as well as police harassment but does not provide any analysis as to the meaning of 
African Americans utilizing the automobile as a tool for empowerment. Furthermore Theoharis 
glosses over the sheer magnitude and importance of the carpool giving more credence again to 
leadership in the boycott.  
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police harassment, ignoring that cars are at the heart of the issue, and that the police 
department is obsessed with them.37 
Following the publication of Fairclough, Garrow, and Branch’s respective 
works, Historian David Chappell sought to fill some of the gaps left in the 
historiography. Chappell’s biography of King, A Stone of Hope: Prophetic Religion and 
the Death of Jim Crow, focuses on King through religion and rhetoric.38 Due to this 
focus, in the context of the Montgomery Bus Boycott, Chappell examines the rhetoric 
of Sunday mass and the mass meetings carefully, but does not give much attention 
to any of the products of those meetings, particularly omitting the carpools from his 
sections dealing with the boycott. Chappell is however aware of the carpool, as he 
does include minimal information about it in another of his works on the Civil Rights 
Movement, Inside Agitators: White Southerners in the Civil Rights Movement.39 As the 
title denotes, in this work Chappell directed his attention to the white southerners 
who aided the Civil Rights Movement, whom prior to Inside Agitators were often 
mentioned but their general presence never examined. What did it mean for a white 
man or woman to aid African Americans in a racially stratified society? This is the 
question at the heart of Chappell’s work and he does provide some insight into the 
Montgomery Bus Boycott, particularly focusing on the Durr and Graetz families, 
whites who drove and aided the carpool and boycott. Chappell largely ignores the 
                                                        
37 David Garrow, Bearing the Cross: Martin Luther King Jr. and the Southern Christian Leadership 
Conference (New York: William Morrow & Company, 1986), 54. 
38 David Chappell, A Stone of Hope: Prophetic Religion and the Death of Jim Crow (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2004) 
39 David Chappell, Inside Agitators: White Southerners in the Civil Rights Movement (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1996) 
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carpool, as the goal of his historical work was to examine white individuals leading 
the boycott, rather than looking at the masses who kept the boycott going.   
 Another monograph published in 2006 by Mary Stanton, The Hand of Esau: 
Montgomery’s Jewish Community and the Bus Boycott, vowed in the prologue to 
examine the Jewish communities reaction to the boycott, however it instead 
provided a narrative documentary history of the boycott, with no attention paid to 
the carpool, and offered virtually no analysis of the boycott itself.40 While this work 
provides important sources to understanding the diverse makeup of Montgomery in 
the 1950s and may spur historians to look deeper into Jewish involvement in the 
Civil Rights Movement, The Hand of Esau it is not significantly helpful to the 
historiography of the bus boycott.41 
African American exploitation of the technological system of the automobile 
changed the landscape of transportation. African American pooling of resources of 
automobility to fight for equal rights bore significant consequences that reach into 
the present and demand further analysis from historians. This study is a part of that 
story, and seeks to explain how African Americans throughout the 20th century 
applied long-held pooling skills to automotion, both in jitney buses and cars, in an 
effort to shake free the binds of white supremacy. 
                                                        
40  Mary Stanton, The Hand of Esau: Montgomery’s Jewish Community and the Bus Boycott 
(Montgomery: River Publishing, 2006.) 
41 Another peculiar book on the boycott focused solely on “God’s” role in the boycott. Let My People 
Go!: The Miracle of the Montgomery Bus Boycott by Robert J. Walker, examines the role of the divine in 
the success of the boycott. The book’s jacket proclaims the work to be, “historically based, but mostly 
inspirational…” and throughout the book Walker gives “God” the role of an “outside agitator” actively 
working through individuals to shape the boycott. Walker does acknowledge mortal actors in the 
boycott but does not provide a nuanced, secular analysis of the pivotal event. While one should not 
look to this book for historical information or analysis, it does provide some very useful footnotes, 
however one should be careful to check the reliability of some sources used. 
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Chapter One: Jitney Buses and African American Desires for Alternative Public 
Transportation 
The creation of a streetcar transportation system was not a benign addition 
to the urban landscape. As with any technology people quickly applied engrained 
values and hierarchies to them. America’s racial hierarchy became inseparable from 
streetcars, and segregation soon regulated that social space. Many African 
Americans immediately rejected the idea of segregation laws and looked for ways to 
challenge the white dominated power hierarchy. The most prominent of these 
challenges came during the early 1900s in the form of black owned, operated, and 
patronized transportation systems that revolved around one piece of technology: 
the jitney bus. Jitney buses were automobiles outfitted to fit more people that the 
car they are built upon was originally designed to carry. Jitneys got their name from 
the nickel the operator typically charged as a passengers fare. Five cents was 
colloquially referred to as a jitney and thus the jitney bus got its name. These buses 
typically sat at least eight people and had space on the outside of the cab to hold on 
to so that more passengers could be accommodated and allowed passengers to 
break free from the streetcars without purchasing their own automobiles. The 
automobile, modified into a jitney, was the premiere tool used by African Americans 
to gain power in a system that largely left them powerless.42  
                                                        
42 There have been several historical studies of jitney buses, specifically August Meier and Elliott 
Rudwick’s, "The Boycott Movement against Jim Crow Streetcars in the South, 1900-1906" The Journal 
of American History 55 no.4 (March, 1969): 756-775; Ross D. Eckert and George W. Hilton “The 
Jitneys,” Journal of Law and Economics 15, no. 2 (October 1972): 293-325, www.jstor.org (accesses 
November 29, 2014); Blaine A. Brownell’s, “A Symbol of Modernity: Attitudes toward the Automobile 
in Southern Cities in the 1920s," American Quarterly 24 no. 1 (March 1972):20-44; and Julian C. 
Chambliss,  “A question of Progress and Welfare: The Jitney Bus Phenomenon in Atlanta: 1915-1925,” 
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By the 1900s jitneys were a major factor in public transportation with one 
North Carolinian city being home to over twenty-two black owned jitney companies 
employing a total of thirty-five jitneys, all within the confines of a fairly small city.43 
Jitneys became the most promising means of challenging streetcar segregation for 
African Americans however white legislators brought their own challenges to the 
rise in jitneys, and a fluid tug of war for power over public transportation space 
ensued.  
Streetcars were not initially segregated. While there may have been 
segregation in practice, such was unlikely or at least uncommon as indicated by the 
initial resistance with which segregation laws were met. African Americans along 
with the streetcar companies fought segregation laws, albeit each for very different 
reasons. African Americans understood that separation from whites meant they 
would not be guaranteed the same quality environment that whites enjoyed. This 
was thoroughly apparent on train cars where black passengers were relegated to 
the lowest class car, while economic class further divided acceptable social and 
mental spaces for whites.  Poor whites who could not afford first class tickets 
inhabited the lower class coaches, often sharing those social spaces with African 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Georgia Historical Quarterly 92, no. 4 (Winter 2008): 486-506 www.jstor.org (accessed November 29, 
2014) All of these historical works pushed jitneys into the conversation, but did not fully examine the 
power dynamics that arose out of the jitney operations. Historians have covered segregated 
streetcars for some time, the most recent and most relevant to this study being Blair Murphy Kelly, 
Right to Ride: Streetcar Boycotts and African American Citizenship in the Era of Plessy V. Ferguson 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010) in which Kelly maps the various boycotts that 
took place challenging streetcar segregation but oddly only makes passing reference to substitutes to 
the streetcars once in regards to taxi cabs (jitneys) in Richmond, Virginia (151)   
43 For more on this particular community in Winston-Salem see Bertha Miller Hampton, “Blacks in 
Winston-Salem, North Carolina 1895-1920: Community Development in an Era of Benevolent 
Paternalism” (PhD diss., Duke University, 1981), 246. 
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Americans. African Americans knew they would loose out in a legally segregated 
system.44 
The majority of streetcar company owners resisted segregation as being 
economically nonsensical. Costs were at the heart of these businessmen’s distaste 
for segregation laws as there was no clear model to use in the implementation of 
such laws, and every option required increased spending, decreased revenue, or 
both. As one newspaper explained the arguments against segregation laws on 
streetcars were, “chiefly based on considerations of expediency and business.45 
Owners felt that segregation laws resulted in decreased black patronage, especially 
where other transportation options existed, and therefore decreased profits.46 
Separate cars could be bought to carry black passengers, but that solution required 
the increased spending on the car itself as well as the regular maintenance costs for 
the extra streetcar. Streetcar owners did not see it as cost effective to have entirely 
separate cars for white and black passengers. The most pragmatic solution was to 
create separate sections of the streetcars, one for black passengers and one for 
whites. This however would require enforcement of the rules, which also did not 
come free. However, despite initial resistance on the part of streetcar owners, white 
public opinion at times swayed these businessmen who then retracted their 
previous contestations of segregation.47 Segregation within cars enabled companies 
to conform to the desires of the law. The streetcar companies’ solution allowed the 
                                                        
44 W. C. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow, 30-32. 
45 “The Separate Car Bill,” The Daily Picayune, New Orleans, July 3, 1900 infoweb.newsbank.com 
(accessed April 5, 2015) 
46 Kelly, Right to Ride, 115. 
47 Meier and Rudwick, "The Boycott Movement against Jim Crow Streetcars in the South, 1900-1906" 
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corporations a great deal of flexibility when it came to segregation as they could 
adjust the number of spaces allocated for each race depending upon the demand at 
any specific time, day, or route.  The result was a system in which African Americans 
in many southern cities, could not avoid segregated aspects of society on a daily 
basis, and were forced to have some amount of interaction with the hostile whites of 
the community, or at least those who both rode, and operated the streetcars. African 
Americans who could not opt out of streetcar transportation, therefore could not 
opt of segregated social and physical spaces. 
Once city councils and county supervisors began to follow the segregation 
pattern set by state legislators on railroads, Jim Crow rapidly came to dominate 
streetcar operation. As the South completed its nearly uniform segregation of 
railcars, a wave of segregation laws swept through southern states, beginning with 
Georgia in 1891.48 The earliest laws regarding segregated streetcars did not require 
segregation in every detail, but rather “as much as practicable” leaving much of the 
application of the laws up to the streetcar companies, judges, police officers, and 
lawyers.49 This led to a fairly heterogeneous and inconsistent implementation of 
actual segregation upon streetcars, leaving many whites unsatisfied. What followed 
was a string of laws passed at the city and county level that sought to supplement 
the state segregation laws, making segregation a requirement for streetcars 
throughout the South.50 
                                                        
48 Meier and Rudwick, 754-755. 
49 Meier and Rudwick, 756. 
50 Meier and Rudwick, 758. 
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An important note here is that segregation laws pertaining to other social 
spaces existed previously, but did not specifically involve local transportation, 
however transportation the first space that segregation laws were challenged.51 
Segregation on a transportation level, for African Americans, was something 
different. A segregated pool or theatre did not require African Americans to interact 
with whites, and they largely could avoid hostile whites in these physical spaces. 
Unlike swimming pools and water fountains, streetcars were not constructed and 
owned by the city or state. They were instead the property of private corporations, 
which held profit as a major factor in decision-making. Separate facilities were 
constructed or separate days and times established for African Americans and 
whites to use a recreational facility. Thus a black swimmer would likely never 
engage a white person in a pool.  Furthermore, segregated recreational facilities 
typically involved activities that African Americans could opt-out of in general.52 
There is nothing of necessity involved with a segregated swimming pool, nor a 
movie theatre. Most African Americans did not rely upon any of these facilities to 
maintain a job, buy groceries, or carry out any of the typical daily chores that were 
required of them. Recreation was not a requirement. The same could not be said for 
transportation.53  
                                                        
51 While trains were some of the first physical spaces that came under the authority of legalized 
segregation, they likely were not social spaces that the majority of Americans both white and black 
experienced on a daily basis.   
52 Jeff Wiltse, Contested Waters: A Social History of Swimming Pools in America (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 1-3. Wiltse’s monograph explains the complexities and 
ramifications of segregated recreational facilities, and the introduction explains the effects of “opting 
out” of some of these facilities.  
53 Edward L. Ayers, The Promise of the New South: Life After Reconstruction (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1992, 137.  
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Historian Edward L. Ayers takes a similar view on segregated transportation 
in the form of the railroads. Ayers explains that African Americans often preferred 
to use black run businesses in order to avoid the exclusion faced in and on white 
owned businesses, however both races could not avoid the use of railroads which 
did not have separate trains entirely and thus set about creating the first shared 
segregated space.54 The biggest difference between the trains and the streetcars was 
that trains easily adopted separate coaches while streetcars almost unanimously 
relied on imaginary lines drawn in an shared open air space. Regardless of this 
difference, the framework Ayers placed on transportation via rail fits with 
transportation via streetcar, or bus for that matter.  
Unlike recreational facilities such as swimming pools, these streetcars were a 
necessity. Because of entrenched racial economic inequalities very few African 
Americans could afford the new automobiles being cranked out of factories. In fact 
very few urban dwellers, black or white, owned cars in the early 1900s.55 They 
turned instead to the streetcars as a means of getting back and forth to work, to 
shops, and to see friends or families that were not within walking distance. 56 While 
urban centers often give the impression that walking is a viable means of 
transporting oneself, walking was often unreasonable for both African Americans 
and whites. Urban sprawl and a lack of equal business representation extended the 
                                                        
54 Ayers, The Promise of the New South: Life After Reconstruction, 137-138. 
55 Franz, “The Open Road: Automobility and Racial Uplift in the Interwar Years”, 142. 
56 Ayers, The Promise of the New South, 324. 
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physical space that city dwellers needed to travel.57 By 1924, Atlanta which had a 
bustling streetcar system, was roughly fifty square miles with the average streetcar 
lines covering approximately four miles of distance.58 This was too far to reasonably 
walk, especially if one was carrying anything. People did not always have to get 
themselves all the way across town, but even going from just outside the heart of the 
urban center into Atlanta’s downtown was a distance of more than three miles. 
Streetcars were essential to urban travel.59 
On the streetcars, if a driver was not content with the behavior of an African 
American passenger, or simply desired to lord power over an unsuspecting black 
individual, he or she could demand the passenger leave the streetcar, alert the 
authorities, contrive an offense, or at times physically beat a passenger with 
unsurprisingly no legal ramification. These drivers benefitted from the system of 
white supremacy. While the regularity of physical abuse on the streetcars may not 
be determined, in Atlanta in 1921 the regularity of abuse in general can be inferred 
from an interracial meeting held in which members of the African American 
community called for white streetcar drivers who were “found guilty of brusque, 
and unpolite treatment” to be dismissed at once.60 The problem of abuse on 
streetcars was clearly severe enough that a meeting was called between leaders of 
                                                        
57 For a superb introduction on the history, effects, and causes for urban sprawl see Paul L. Knox and 
Linda McCarthy, Urbanization: An Introduction to Urban Georgaphy (New York: Pearson, 2012), 70-
74.  
58 The Beeler Organization Consultants “Map of Atlanta Streetcar Network, 1924” 
http://www.librarything.com/work/13658114 
59 Meier and Rudwick, 762.  
60  “Inter-Racial Meeting at Allen Temple a Success,” Atlanta Independent, August 25, 1921. 
http://news.google.com/newspapers (accessed November 25, 2014). 
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both the black and white community to solve the problem, and one of the main 
discussion points addressed precisely that abuse.  
The fact that African Americans had to demand that any abusive driver be 
dismissed indicates that prior to this meeting, drivers harming black patrons 
received little or no repercussions from the law or the streetcar company. 
Furthermore, the inclusion of abuse amongst claims of brusque and “impolite” 
behavior indicates that an actual physical assault could be as common as a rude 
gesture. While assault was clearly against the law, little must have been done about 
physical violence, because African Americans sought means of punishing these 
drivers that did not involve the authorities: namely the firing of abusive drivers. 
This can be explained either by the failure to arrest or prosecute those who 
committed such acts, or by African American’s distrust in the legal system to 
successfully prosecute such offenders. In either scenario, the law was not effectively 
dealing with the African American abuse at the hands of streetcar drivers. The fact 
that this meeting made it into the news was a further indication of the severity and 
regularity of abuse on segregated streetcars. Whether anyone of the Atlanta 
Independent’s subscribers ever read this article is not anything that historians can 
ever hope to prove, but this is also of little importance. The editor of the Atlanta 
Independent and the author of the article saw the problem important enough to 
publish in the newspaper indicating that abuse was not a fringe occurrence. The 
article does not ever mention one incident in particular. Had abuse at the hands of a 
streetcar operator been a singular event, it is highly likely that a singular event 
would have been specifically mentioned, but the absence of any mention of this type 
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of individual occurrence illustrates the commonality of the abuses and 
mistreatments.61  
The most permanent of structures on segregated streetcars (and the one 
most clearly translated onto buses later) were signs denoting the African American 
seating sections from the white ones. As streetcar companies sought to increase 
revenue by decreasing overhead, they converted many traditionally two-coach large 
streetcar lines that required two operators, to smaller “one-man” cars that as their 
name denotes, only required one operator. This smaller space, when coupled with 
only one entrance and exit door created racial space anxiety amongst whites who 
were accustomed to and vocally in favor of as little interaction with African 
Americans as possible within public transportation spaces. While streetcar 
companies were unwilling to convert back to two coach cars, they were willing to 
install signs that marked black and white sections of the car.62 African Americans 
would be seated in the back, with whites located at the front, and the signs were 
permanent visual reminders of Jim Crow and the second-class status of African 
Americans. In other instances the anxiety of shared space between African 
Americans and whites was alleviated through the increase in cars that serviced 
predominately black sections of the city. In this practice, “White people then finding 
a car full of blacks, understand that there will be another car very shortly which will 
not be thus loaded. There is however no law or rule to prevent a white person from 
                                                        
61 “Inter-Racial Meeting at Allen Temple a Success,” Atlanta Independent 
62 “Birmingham’s Race Problem: Company Will Try Out Twenty-Five One-Man Cars Using New 
Equipment for Segregation” 1064. 
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getting onto a car full of negroes if he wants to do so…”63 Streetcar companies 
accommodated white desires and assuaged white anxieties, but had no concern for 
the welfare or desires of African Americans. Furthermore the law banned African 
Americans from entering white allocated spaces, while whites were permitted to 
enter black dominated spaces per their pleasure. African Americans were clearly 
second-class citizens in the minds of streetcar company owners, and while these 
owners accommodated whites, they seemed to “put up with” black patrons. Black 
passengers were moved to the back of the streetcar or limited to certain cars as if 
they were a part of the coach itself; furniture that could be moved about without 
question or placed in separate coaches without any consultation. However, African 
Americans would not sit as idle furniture, instead they organized their own means 
of public transportation, or took advantage of other options. 
African Americans across the country almost immediately resisted 
segregated streetcars. They opposed segregation laws through political action, mass 
meetings, and more commonly, boycotts.64 While black community leaders called 
for boycotts, they did not suggest an alternate form of public transportation, largely 
due to the lack of viable options. Ida B. Wells was one of the first African Americans 
to suggest boycotts as a means of resistance. In 1892, before the dawn of the 
automobile age, Wells called for a boycott of Memphis streetcars in retaliation to the 
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extensive lynchings that took place in Memphis earlier that year.65 Segregation on 
streetcars was not inherently tied to lynching, yet Wells viewed the two as being 
connected. For Wells, segregation was not the object she wished to fight against but 
rather white supremacy in general. Wells saw the entire system of white supremacy 
as connecting all that were complicit in the hierarchical structure, and therefore it 
made sense for her to call for a boycott of the segregated streetcars. Along with the 
boycott Wells encouraged African Americans living in Memphis to abandon the city 
and move elsewhere. This was met with decent success as an estimated 4,000 
African Americans left the city.66 The abandonment of the city was more viable for 
the Memphis black community than the boycott, which faded as no other means of 
transportation was established to replace the streetcars, and the 1896 Plessy v. 
Ferguson decision gave the Supreme Court’s nod to segregated transportation.67 
  In 1905 one group of black ministers in Jacksonville, Florida called for the 
community to boycott the streetcars, “in order to retain our self respect…Don’t be 
Jim Crowed, Walk!”68 This urge to walk came largely because of the lack of a 
successful jitney program within Jacksonville. Black jitney companies and 
cooperatives were not found in every city in the United States however, in those that 
did exist, jitneys would be the predominant tool for resistance to Jim Crow 
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transportation and at times worked in tandem with streetcar boycotts.69 Again in 
1905, in Nashville, Tennessee, a streetcar boycott was organized to fight 
segregation. The boycotters first organized a horse drawn carriage as an alternative 
to the streetcars but the system was not sufficient as the number of black patrons 
overwhelmed the slow carriages. The boycotters organized into a company and sold 
stock as a means of raising funds. By September they raised over $7,000 and 
purchased electric buses to replace the carriages. Initially these buses, which carried 
fifteen passengers at a time, were a major success. However, as patronage increased 
the buses were met with major issues. The buses’ electric motors were not powerful 
enough to take full loads of passengers up and down the steep Nashville hills. While 
efforts were made to increase their power, the measures were not enough and 
further battery problems caused frustrated black passengers return to the 
streetcars by winter.70  
While these electric buses did not create a long-term replacement to the 
streetcars, they did successfully extend the boycott months past the failing use of 
horse drawn carriages. The buses served as a social and mental space where African 
Americans avoided whites, and avoided the degrading social space of the streetcars. 
Electric buses were just not reliable enough, did not recharge quickly enough, and 
were not powerful enough to meet the demands of traffic and terrain.  
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Gas powered jitneys on the other hand would suit those needs perfectly. 
Black Passengers could be dropped off all across cities, without being subject to 
racist abuse, or the mere degradation of streetcar segregation that one black 
reverend and community leader described as “unjust, barbaric…and cowardly.”71 
The jitneys, unconfined to any preset or pre-established route, could drop 
passengers off at specific locations, rather than waiting for a stop that is nearest 
their actual destination. Not all jitneys were black owned and operated though. The 
jitneys were also a successful means for challenging corrupt streetcar companies 
and were used to do just so. The jitneys African Americans did frequent were 
predominately operated by African American drivers and owned by African 
American businessmen. This was immensely important, as passengers were not 
subjected to the abuse that they could find themselves subject to on the segregated 
streetcars.72 
The most permanent of structures on segregated streetcars (and the one 
most clearly translated onto buses later) were signs denoting the African American 
seating sections from the white ones. As streetcar companies sought to increase 
revenue by decreasing overhead, they converted many traditionally two-coach large 
streetcar lines that required two operator, to smaller “one-man” cars that as their 
name denotes, only required one operator. This smaller space, when coupled with 
only one entrance and exit door created racial space anxiety amongst whites who 
were accustomed to and vocally in favor of as little interaction with African 
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Americans as possible on spaces of public transportation. While streetcar 
companies were unwilling to convert back to two coach cars, they were willing to 
install signs that marked black and white sections of the car.73 African Americans 
would be seated in the back, with whites located at the front, and the signs were 
permanent visual reminders of Jim Crow and the second-class status of African 
Americans. In other instances the anxiety of shared space between African 
Americans and whites was alleviated through the increase in cars that serviced 
predominately black sections of the city. In this practice, “White people then finding 
a car full of blacks, understand that there will be another car very shortly which will 
not be thus loaded. There is however no law or rule to prevent a white person from 
getting onto a car full of negroes if he wants to do so…”74 Streetcar companies 
accommodated white desires and assuaged white anxieties, but had no concern for 
the welfare or desires of African Americans. Furthermore the law banned African 
Americans from entering white allocated spaces, while whites were permitted to 
enter black dominated spaces per their pleasure. African Americans were clearly 
second-class citizens in the minds of streetcar company owners, and while these 
owners accommodated whites, they seemed to “put up with” black patrons. Black 
passengers were moved to the back of the streetcar or limited to certain cars as if 
they were a part of the coach itself; furniture that could be moved about without 
question or placed in separate coaches without any consultation. However, African 
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Americans would not sit as idle furniture, instead they organized their own means 
of public transportation, or took advantage of other options. 
By the 1920s black-owned jitneys provided new mobility, and new power to 
African Americans tired of degrading streetcar policies and practices. In Atlanta, 
another topic on the agenda at this meeting was the creation of, “an exclusive bus 
line operated by colored capitalists.”75 The term bus line here can be read as “jitney 
service” for African American bus lines at this period bore no distinct difference 
between the services jitneys provided.76 Atlanta’s African American community 
demonstrated their clear desire to remove themselves from institutions of 
segregation where possible. African Americans saw the mere existence of legal 
segregation as demeaning. As August Meir and Elliot Redwick point out, “protests 
through mass meetings, petitions to city councils and legislatures, and even an 
occasional boycott, often began while the segregation bills were being 
considered.”77 While the community leaders at this meeting demanded that abusive 
drivers be dismissed from their jobs, they also likely did not trust that this demand 
would be met, or at least did not see segregated streetcars even with polite drivers 
as the best form of transportation they could utilize.  
There existed a seeming irony of segregation within this community. While 
meeting in an “inter-racial” group, seeking to rectify injustices of the segregated 
system, these African Americans were not trying to topple the system of 
segregation, but rather remove themselves from physical spaces in which white 
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dominated social systems dictated the terms of segregation. They clearly stated the 
desire for an “exclusive” form of transportation. These African Americans used the 
word exclusive to design a system that, like streetcar segregation, was to be based 
upon skin color. The difference between this system and that of the streetcars was 
that there was actually further separation between African Americans and whites. 
Rather than share a streetcar in which seating would be separated, the African 
Americans of this community, and every community that utilized black owned jitney 
companies, decided that if segregation was to be enforced they wanted it on their 
own terms. The establishment of an entirely separate transportation line was far 
more segregated that that of the streetcars, but it was segregation on African 
American terms or rather African Americans dictated the rules to be enacted in the 
space of the jitneys. This marks a difference that African Americans drew between 
Jim Crow segregation and the separation of races. The point brought up at the 
Atlanta meeting was that if possible, African Americans should, “Buy a car of your 
own and escape Jim-Crowism from street car service.”78 Separation from whites did 
not in this case mean the same thing as Jim Crow segregation, as long as it was 
separation at the hands and under the power of African Americans. While it may 
have been ideal for African Americans to purchase their own cars, the majority were 
not in the financial situation to be able to make such a purchase. If African 
Americans opted out of the segregated streetcars, they voluntarily removed 
themselves further from spaces where whites maintained authority. Jim Crow 
segregation meant that whites told African Americans where they could and could 
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not be; it meant that whites allowed African Americans into white spaces. Whites 
were rarely if ever fined, arrested, or prosecuted for using “colored” facilities.79 This 
was because in Jim Crow America whites were superior; whites held authority, and 
whites controlled space. This is why the “exclusivity” of the black line that was being 
proposed was so powerful. This would have been an instance in which African 
Americans controlled the space of the bus or jitney; in which African Americans 
could tell whites that they were not welcome. As jitneys or privately owned cars, 
automobility injected new power-granting resources into established racial 
transportation structures. This power of black exclusivity threatened white 
supremacy. This threat was one that those who sought to maintain white supremacy 
reacted against. Whites drew up legislation to drive the jitneys off the roads. 
While jitney buses allowed African Americans to claim authority over their 
own transportation systems, it is very unlikely that whites would ever have tried to 
use these separate systems. However, white supremacists did not react to the 
jitneys because they desired to actually use any black owned and operated system, 
but rather they reacted because the jitneys were taking power and authority out of 
the hands of white supremacists. The very idea that an African American could deny 
admission to a white citizen, could tell a white citizen that they were not allowed 
into a particular space, and could escape the system in which whites controlled the 
authority for delineating acceptable spaces for races was unacceptable to white 
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supremacists. White supremacists operated under the notion that they could never 
give up power, as in the minds of many white supremacists, the relinquishing of 
even some power threatened white supremacy as a whole.80 Under the guise of 
public safety, those who desired to maintain Jim Crow America largely expunged the 
jitneys, which up to their prohibition in the 1920s were the most successful tool 
African Americans had in the fight against segregation. These laws, enacted 
throughout the South as well as western states such as California, never directly 
engaged or acknowledged the fact that African Americans, for a time, stole away a 
portion of power typically reserved for whites, and it was this near loss of power 
that most threatened the entire body of segregation politics.  
Following the advent of the jitneys the first decade of the 1900s saw massive 
opposition from streetcar companies, legislators, white supremacists, and a host of 
others who desired to maintain the streetcar systems. The legislation that arose to 
do away with the jitneys has been effectively documented by historians Ross D. 
Eckert and George W. Hilton. Rather than focus on race, Eckert and Hilton viewed 
the legislation through an economic lens, highlighting how loss of revenue from the 
streetcar companies was a strong motivator in outlawing the jitneys.81  Money most 
certainly played a major role in legislation aimed against jitneys and while it is clear 
that race was not the only factor at play when jitneys were virtually outlawed, white 
supremacists most certainly reacted to the threat the jitneys posed by embracing 
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the economic argument as well. White supremacists, streetcar corporations, and 
those that held streetcar stock shared a common desire to do away with the jitneys. 
African American jitney companies faced the same threats and were done away with 
through the same means as other jitney systems. Economic were a powerful 
motivating force against the jitneys, but race also played a significant part in 
specifically targeting black jitney systems.82 
Segregation legislation continued to be a major tool in regulating the jitneys 
as white authority sought to recuperate the power being taken by African American 
jitney companies. A 1915 Houston a law created segregation among all jitneys 
within the city.83 By introducing segregation to the jitney buses the city officials 
established regulations that took authority from the jitney owners. Previously, 
jitney owners dictated appropriate space within the cabs of the jitneys, providing 
African Americans jitney owners the rare and powerful ability to exclude whites. 
Even if this power was never exercised the ability for African Americans to relegate 
appropriate space based on race or any other means was unacceptable to those 
benefiting from white supremacy.  
The anonymous author of “Jitney Bus Wins Favor Quickly” in conjunction 
with the Houston ordinance identified other regulations that included surety bonds, 
patron regulations and regulations aimed at stratifying and cementing routes that 
jitneys could run.84 These were all forms of regulation that targeted jitneys, and 
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while racial motivations certainly contributed to the addition of such regulations it 
was not the sole motivating factor. 
In Jacksonville, Florida in 1917, race was however at the forefront of 
increased regulations made on Jitney buses. Legislators drafted a law demanding 
that jitneys stop for any person regardless of race.85 At face value this seems to be a 
challenge to segregation, however one must take into account the context within 
which this law was created. Jacksonville had several jitney systems, one of which 
was a successful black owned and operated system. The law was supported by 
members of the Georgia Railway and Power Company (GRPC), a Georgian company 
that supported and advocated for streetcars and actively campaigned to outlaw and 
regulate jitney buses.86 The law in Jacksonville did not exist within a vacuum and 
caught the attention of some outside of Florida.  At a meeting called four years later 
by the GRPC members of the group identified that a major reason for the success of 
jitney buses in Jacksonville, and across the country was in part the regular use of 
black owned jitney buses by black communities in various cities. The GPRC correctly 
identified that the exclusive jitney service African Americans enjoyed in Jacksonville 
was a successful means of not only avoiding the Jim Crow streetcars, but also 
creating a successful, competitive, black owned company. The black owned jitneys 
of Jacksonville were operating at strength for several years, and were not showing 
signs of failure while simultaneously refusing to pick up white passengers, 
maintaining a technically segregated space without making African Americans 
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second-class citizens.87 By forcing the jitney buses to pick up passengers of any race, 
the power of exclusivity and the delegation of space that black owned jitney bus 
operators enjoyed was done away with. These jitneys that previously serviced only 
black passengers, now would have to meet the demands of white passengers as well. 
Furthermore the jitneys would have to create segregated seating since they were 
required to service both black, and white passengers. This law allowed power to be 
placed back into the hands of Jacksonville police, who could in theory enforce the 
law upon African American jitney operators, while allowing white jitney operators 
to continue to pick up only white passengers.88 Thus white control of the law 
trumped the temporary power granted by automobile technological resources. 
What is important here is that the power that was gained by black jitney owners 
was lost through the establishment of this law, and furthermore, that power was 
again placed back into the hands of authorities. While jitneys, which became 
desegregated, would vanish from Jacksonville, no law would end segregation on the 
streetcars or buses that grew out of streetcar operations until the 1960s.89 
The GPRC’s attention to the Jacksonville law was a rare case. It is the only 
instance yet to be found in which the GRPC supported laws requiring businesses to 
service both races. It does not seem that the GPRC ever challenged some of the cabs 
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and jitneys that refused to service black patrons. The GPRC would simultaneously 
champion for increased regulation of all sorts, including but not limited to streetcars 
and jitneys.90  
While there were numerous motivations that brought forth jitney regulation, 
the excuse given was one which conflated racial and commercial motivations: public 
safety. In the same New York Times article that listed the 1915 Houston Law 
numerous other laws were identified all of which connected in some way to the idea 
of public safety. Ordnances on segregation were justified through ideas that, “the 
mixing of races is seen to be dangerous for all involved” with special attention paid 
to “a large number of complaints received from young girls.”91 White anxiety 
regarding African American men among young girls while not new, was still 
effective in helping to pass the segregation regulations and restrictions on routes. 
The article explains the ramification of one popular regulation that limited the 
routes of jitneys stating the regulation would, “put them (the jitneys) in a different 
category from that in which they began. The earliest jitneys bore the slogan, ‘Take 
you anywhere for a jitney’; meaning that the limitations of rails and franchises were 
to be abolished…”92 The lack of free mobility of the jitney would take away one of 
the key technical features that made it such a success. It would do away with the 
freedom of movement that jitney operators and passengers enjoyed, and force jitney 
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drivers into a rigid route. Segregation, fixed routes, extensive licensure and a volley 
of other regulations largely brought an end to the jitneys.93 
One company however prevailed. The Safe Bus Co. out of Winston-Salem, 
North Carolina is the sole shining success story of the jitney age. Jitneys emerged as 
a popular form of transportation for the black community of Winston-Salem, not 
only because of the segregation implemented on the streetcars of the city, but also 
due to the simple fact that streetcars largely did not run within the black 
community. The jitneys of the North Carolina city, like other urban cities across the 
country, experienced immense success.94 Numerous black owned jitney services 
arose and provided the black citizens of Winston-Salem with a means of 
transportation that avoided segregation, economically empowered the community, 
and perhaps most important, gave them an exclusive space of control. The Safe Bus 
Co. was actually created out of increased regulations on numerous Winston-Salem 
jitney services. These regulations threatened the continuance of any and all jitneys 
in Winston-Salem. This call for regulation was again came with the excuse of “public 
safety.”95 By 1926, the Winston-Salem jitneys faced similar regulations that others 
came under, but instead of folding due to the financial pressures that increased 
regulation brought, the numerous Winston Salem jitney operations banded together 
and incorporated.96 
By 1926 the city was home to, “22 Negroes operating 35 jitneys…” a number 
that provided strength to the cause of African American transportation in Winston 
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Salem.97 The owners of these jitney operations raised the money necessary to pay 
incorporation fees and in 1926, “organized at a $100,000 capitalization.”98 The 
ability to overcome the regulations often designed to cripple the jitney companies 
speaks to the economic power that could be generated through black transportation 
culture. The economic success of the Winston-Salem jitneys is what provided the 
means to successfully organize and incorporate, and this success would follow the 
company out of the jitney period and into that of the bus line.99 
The Safe Bus Co. is a singular instance of sustained success of the jitney 
service, bears a significant place in the history of African American utilization of the 
jitney bus, and stands as a lasting example of the success of black business in an era 
in which black businesses captured power that previously was denied. The ability of 
Winston Salem’s jitney operators to rapidly organize and incorporate helped them 
maintain at least some of that new power, despite white control of the regulatory 
process. These jitney owners maintained power through black mobility achieved 
from the technological resource of automobiles.  It also is a prime example of the 
methods and strengths that came emerge out of black exclusivity, black economic 
power, and black organization all of which were key to later successful instances of 
resistance to Jim Crow. 
Streetcars largely never faced desegregation as they gave way to buses. The 
replacing of one technological system with another led to the increased 
implementation of bus lines, which offered many of the basic advantages enjoyed by 
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both African American and white jitney passengers and operators. Buses, while tied 
to a set route, could navigate through city blocks much more effectively than 
streetcars. One route may take a bus onto more than a dozen streets and since they 
were unconfined to the rails that streetcars relied upon, routes could be more 
effectively set and changed as the market demanded. Buses replaced streetcars as 
the preeminent mode of urban public transportation and in many cities, African 
Americans became the primary patrons of the buses.  
Alongside buses developed a rich and extensive black automobile economy 
that mirrored national trends. Black motorists utilized copies of “The Negro 
Motorist Green Book” to navigate while traveling finding within the pages lists of 
restaurants, hotels, service stations and numerous other travel necessities welcome 
to African Americans.  African American service stations became hubs for black 
motorists to fill their tanks as well as repair their cars. The mechanics that worked 
on these cars developed a vast amount of knowledge while providing an essential 
service to the black community in an environment that welcomed black customers, 
rather than rejecting or abusing them.100 The black auto economy became one of the 
backbones of black business as cars became available to more African Americans.  
Although the jitney largely vanished from the streets of major cities, it served 
as a prime example of the empowerment that could be grasped through the use of 
the automobile, and African American communities would again look to the car as a 
tool to fight white supremacy. The lasting legacy of the jitney bus should African 
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Americans’ ability exploitation of the jitney in navigate through segregation on their 
own terms, temporarily claiming power through mobility and spatial authority. 
Although regulation mostly restored white control over urban black mobility prior 
to World War II, the automobile was again brought to the frontlines in the fight for 
civil rights in the 1950s to help topple Jim Crow, and again empower black 
communities through automobility. 
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Chapter 2: Pooling: African Americans, Automobiles, and Black Organization 
in the Montgomery Bus Boycott 
It was a mild afternoon in Montgomery the day the police arrested Claudette 
Colvin.101 There was nothing abnormal about that day and there was little abnormal 
about her. Her mother was a maid and her father a day laborer, both with little 
education.102 This was more than common it was the experience of the majority of 
Montgomery’s black citizens.103 Nonetheless, despite her normality she fought the 
status quo. She sat on the Montgomery City Bus Lines’ bus refusing the bus driver’s 
demands for her to move further back, and that refusal carried consequences. Bus 
drivers in Montgomery held “the powers of a police officer of the city while in actual 
charge of the bus” and any refusal to obey the driver’s commands was dealt with 
sternly.104 The actual police were then called but she refused to obey them as well. 
The police manhandled her, dragged her off the bus, and threw her in the back seat 
of the patrol car. Even in her arrest she fought the authority of segregation, “kicking 
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and clawing” as the white officers placed her in custody.105 Claudette Colvin was 
only fifteen when she challenged bus segregation in 1955 Montgomery.106  
The rules that governed space on buses in the south followed those that 
ruled over space on streetcars holding strong as Jim Crow laws remained and in 
some spaces expanded.107 Still though, public transportation was one of the 
predominant spaces for black and white interactions as just on the streetcars, all 
passengers on the buses sat within the close proximity of each other confined to the 
fairly small space of public buses. It made sense then that it was there that the rules 
that governed pace would be contested. Like the African Americans jitney 
passengers and operators before them, the black citizens of Montgomery Alabama 
looked to the automobile as a means toward freedom, however unlike in the early 
1900’s, the car would not be used to avoid segregation laws, it would instead be 
used to challenge them as Montgomery’s black community rallied a massive carpool 
system that consisted of over 300 individual cars operated by hundreds of drivers 
and servicing thousands of passengers. This was no small undertaking and the 
carpool bore significant ramifications for Montgomery’s citizens, and for Americans 
across the country changing the way that African Americans communities, and 
authorities that police them interact with the automobile.  
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Buses were vitally important to Montgomery’s African American Community 
in 1955. Historian Steven A. Reich contends that African Americans’ “fight for 
citizenship—for basic social recognition—was thus intimately connected to African 
Americans’ workplace experiences.”108 Reich emphasizes the fact that, as Martin 
Luther King explained it, African Americans were, “a working people.” If African 
Americans were in fact “a working people” then buses were the way many got to 
work in the 1950s. Work was certainly a major part of African American life in 
Montgomery and a large reason why black bus riders rarely challenge segregation in 
those spaces. They could not afford a loss of their service.109  
Colvin’s arrest illustrated the polarization of Montgomery’s community 
across lines of race. Whites saw the arrest as just one witness of the event, a white 
woman named Cameron Collins, expressed her respect for the officers involved 
noting in a letter to the local newspaper, “they [the police officers] used only the 
amount of force necessary and then only when sorely provoked.”110 These were not 
the same sentiments held by Colvin who described being “dragged from the bus.”111 
It is unlikely that Colvin, a fifteen-year-old girl weighing 115 pounds could give two 
grown police officers much difficulty that would as Collins described, provoke the 
officers to use any amount of force.112 One may never know just how abusive or 
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composed the officers were, nonetheless the arrest made waves among the black 
citizens of Montgomery and was one of the real beginnings of pooling resources for 
the bus boycott that came months later. Edgar Daniel Nixon, a public leader among 
the black community, met with the Women’s Political Council (WPC), various 
religious leaders of Montgomery’s black churches, the local chapter of the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), and Clifford Durr, a 
white lawyer who made his reputation defending the civil rights of those in need of 
legal defense.113 This was a powerful group of activists.114 The WPC was started by 
Jo Ann Robinson as a reaction to segregation a decade prior to Colvin’s arrest. In 
1946 Robinson organized the women of Montgomery, establishing the WPC with a 
goal to have members in every important branch of socio-political structure in the 
city.115 The WPC remained active and organized, reaching over 300 members by 
1955. Their three chapters met regularly, discussing issues that Montgomery’s 
African American community faced, and were prepared to mobilize as soon as 
Robinson gave the call. As Robinson herself put it, “Wherever there were more than 
10 blacks employed we had a member there and we were organized to the point 
that we knew that in a matter of hours we could corral the whole city.”116  
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Like Robinson and the WPC, the religious leaders of Montgomery provided 
an avenue for Nixon and other black leaders to reach the larger black community. 
African Americans used churches as venues for religious and political discussion for 
decades, and Montgomery’s black churches in 1955 were no different. Black 
churches were spaces over which whites bore little to no authority and from which 
they were almost entirely absent.117 This absence meant that African Americans 
could discuss common issues they faced as second-class citizens in the largely white 
dominated hierarchy of society. The spaces of black churches were venues that 
allowed for organization, mobilization and dispersal of legal information provided 
by the NAACP.118 
Nixon served for five years on the executive board of the NAACP and knew 
the benefit they would provide any mass action in Montgomery.119 For decades the 
NAACP was at the forefront of legal change regarding African Americans, and in 
1954 they experienced a major victory against segregation in the Brown V. Board of 
Education overturning Plessy v. Ferguson ruled upon over half a decade earlier. 
Although Brown V. Board found that separate was inherently unequal, the federal 
ruling had not yet been implemented by authorities to challenge state power, let 
alone any city power that Montgomery held. Nixon thought it was time that changed. 
The lawyers of the NAACP knew the law. However, despite their legal prowess, the 
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NAACP, “had never been able to organize a mass base.”120 Nixon was connecting 
legal organizers with social ones. It was a brilliant move. 
Nixon was experienced with pooling political and social resources as he was 
president of the Alabama chapter of the brotherhood of the Sleeping Car Porters, an 
organization run by Phillip A. Randolph, a man who himself fought for African 
Americans’ rights, at one point calling in 1941 for a march on Washington to protest 
racial discrimination in the wartime industrial production. A direct result of 
Randolph’s black protests and organization was the executive order 8802 which 
outlawed all racial discrimination in the federal defense industry.121 This was the 
man who Nixon looked up to, the man that helped shape Nixon’s political 
understandings, and the man who in part inspired Nixon to organize for African 
American civil liberties. Nixon knew what would be required for any hope of change 
to Jim Crow, assembled the necessary collaborators, and they all set out to see what 
could be done about buses in Montgomery, Alabama.  
The group of activists closely examined Colvin’s case. They hoped Colvin’s 
arrest, and Colvin herself would be ample reason for Montgomery’s black 
community to rally support and make some kind of change, however what they 
found was not what they were looking for. Colvin was a fifteen-year-old girl, still in 
high school, and one thing that fifteen years olds often do is make mistakes. Colvin 
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was an unmarried pregnant teenager with especially dark skin.122 Colvin herself 
explained the significance of her skin tone saying light skin was the complexion, 
“that most black people accept when they are with the middle class.”123 African 
Americans were not an amorphous body of cohesion, and there were hierarchies 
even within black communities. Light skin was a physical trait with complex social 
ramifications that could benefit or hinder African Americans depending on the 
circumstances.124 Even disregarding Colvin’s complexion the fact that she was a 
teenager, and a pregnant one at that, did not make her an ideal candidate for a 
public, moral cause. Nixon, the WPC and the NAACP agreed that Colvin would not be 
made the “icon” of change in Montgomery.125 Mobilization for civil rights was put on 
the backburner but plans for action did not fade away, and the resources remained 
pooled and remained connected waiting for the time to spring into action: enter 
Rosa Parks.  
Rosa Parks repeated Colvin’s defiance and wouldn’t budge. On a cold 
December 1st in 1955 the small 43-year-old secretary for the NAACP boarded the 
Cleveland Avenue bus in Montgomery, Alabama, taking a seat in the last vacant 
“black” spot. When a handful of white passengers boarded the bus, the driver 
hollered for the African American riders seated in the middle of the bus to stand up. 
One man and two women in the first of the “black rows” complied, while Parks did 
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not budge an inch. The bus driver asked if she was going to give up her seat, only to 
be met with a simple short answer of, “No I am not.” The driver then called the 
police; two officers arrived, boarded the bus and asked Parks, “Why don’t you stand 
up?” She answered the officers with a question of her own replying, “Why do you 
push us around?” The officers waited a moment and one answered, “I do not know, 
but the law is the law and you’re under arrest,” placed the Parks under arrest, and 
took her to jail. Rosa Parks’ actions that day would almost immediately initiate the 
Montgomery bus boycott.126 
Rosa Parks was a woman trained in nonviolent civil disobedience, and while 
December 1st was not planned to be a challenge to segregation, Parks knew 
challenging the driver could potentially be the spark for which E.D. Nixon, the WPC, 
the black ministers of Montgomery and the NAACP had prepared.127 Parks attended 
the meetings months prior when Nixon gathered the groups together to discuss 
Colvin’s case. She was a part of political action in Montgomery and had been for over 
a decade. Parks joined the NAACP in 1943 and was elected secretary, and over a 
decade later in the summer of 1955 attended a seminar in nonviolent civil 
disobedience alongside other white and black civil rights supporters and activists.128 
It was a trained, calculated mind geared toward nonviolent resistance, and civil 
disobedience that Rosa Parks brought with her onto the bus that December day. 
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After her arrest, Rosa Parks phoned Nixon, for whom she worked. Nixon 
made his way down to the local jail, posted bail for Parks, and accompanied her 
home.129 There the two discussed the situation with Parks’ family, and when Nixon 
returned home he summed up the conclusion telling his wife, “Baby, we’re going to 
boycott the Montgomery buses.”130 But, it was not as simple as just deciding not to 
ride the buses. If the boycott was to be effective massive numbers of people needed 
to join the movement, and with no other way to get to work, that was not a likely 
case. All of the leadership Nixon gathered needed to pool and mobilize 
Montgomery’s black population. 
Jo Ann Robinson spearheaded the initial call to boycott and knew the WPC 
were the most effective tool to do so. She was not overestimating the WPC’s 
ability.131 Robinson wasted no time. As soon as she got news of Park’s arrest she set 
the WPC network into motion. She called every member of the three WPC chapters, 
disseminated directions of action and prepared for the call to boycott the buses. The 
directions for the WPC primarily dealt with logistics regarding distribution of 
leaflets that Jo Ann Robinson herself worked through the night printing and cutting 
out. WPC members stood at school campuses and other public venues and received 
the leaflets from Jo Ann Robinson, via her car. Robinson described the system 
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explaining, “I ran of 35,000 copies…I took them in my car. The packages were 
already there. It would take about a half minute to drive on the school campus, the 
kid would be there, in a just a minute they would disappear.”132 In this way, 
Robinson was able to rapidly distribute the 35,000 leaflets calling for a boycott of 
the buses. Prior to even any organization of the carpool the car was filling a vital 
role needed for the boycott. Using her car, Robinson could zip across the city and 
onto the school campuses while carrying the boxes full of leaflets, hand them off to 
members of the WPC and their supporters, and then quickly get to the next stop all 
within the privacy of her car. This was important as time was a major factor in 
rallying for the boycott, and the car directly provided rapid, independent mobility.  
Robinson’s leaflets were quickly distributed among the black community. 
The leaflets explained that another African American woman was arrested tying 
Rosa Parks to Claudette Colvin, and set out the reasons that the black community 
should boycott the buses. The leaflet stated, “Three-fourths of the riders are 
Negroes, yet we are arrested or have to stand over empty seats. If we do not do 
something about these arrests they will continue. The next time it may be you, or 
your daughter, or mother.”133 Gender played a major role in the Montgomery bus 
boycott. Robinson included the idea that a mother or daughter could be arrested 
because she knew that the black community would sympathize with a female more 
so than a male due to the innocence that was tied to femininity. Femininity could be 
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an empowering factor in Montgomery in the 1950s as it both allowed women to 
often be exempt from the most violent or forward acts of racism, and also meant 
that there would be a stronger reaction from the black community should they fall 
victim to pubic displays of racism at the hands of the white citizens of 
Montgomery.134 Jo Ann Robinson explained that often, “black women and the white 
man were the freest people in the southern states.” 135  This is clearly an 
overestimation. Black women were not always exempt from the violence of racism 
in the south, however the fact that Robinson even made this overestimation gives 
credence to the idea that black women could move throughout Montgomery with 
more ease that black men. This is the reason that the WPC was able to garner so 
much support without disrupting the white supremacy hierarchy of Montgomery, 
Alabama. Whites were less suspicious of black women, and their seeming innocence 
meant they could in fact go against that innocence without being detected. However 
the empowerment of femininity did have limitations.  
Robinson initiated the boycott but could not see it through. She describes the 
limitations of feminine empowerment stating that, “the Women’s Political Council 
planned it [the boycott] for Monday only, and it was left up to the men to take over 
after we had forced them to really decide whether or not it had been successful 
enough to continue, and how long it was to be continued.”136 The black women of 
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Montgomery forced the issue to the forefront of the discussion on racial politics, but 
it was left up to the black male leaders to lead the way. While it was acceptable, 
necessary even, for women to be active in the fight for civil rights, their gender 
excluded them from leadership, or at least visible, public leadership. Jo Ann 
Robinson, despite her gender, certainly remained a leader of the boycott, working in 
tandem with black male authority figures throughout the struggle against the bus 
lines and the city of Montgomery. Robinson rallied with Martin Luther King, E.D. 
Nixon and other black ministers at the first mass meeting and set out plans for a 
boycott.137 
Through the leaflets Robinson urged the black community to stay off the 
buses that Monday stating, “You can afford to stay out of school for one day if you 
have no other way to go except by bus. You can also afford to stay out from town 
one day.”138 This was true, the black community could afford one day of abstaining 
from transportation. They may even be able to afford two, but eventually they 
would have to go to school, go to town, and go to work. A seemingly obvious point, 
that is often overlooked in the historical record, is that in this urban environment of 
1955 Montgomery Alabama, some form of transportation other than walking was 
essential to life in Montgomery, and an extended bus boycott impinged on that 
necessity.  
Nixon knew that they had their work cut out for them and the next morning 
called various community religious leaders, among whom were both Reverend 
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Ralph Abernathy, and Reverend Martin Luther King Jr. If the boycott was to survive 
past that Monday, these religious leaders needed to establish a central 
organizational body.139 The result was the Montgomery Improvement Association 
(MIA), which elected Martin Luther King Jr. as its first president, and they 
immediately began organizing the boycott.140 The MIA also that day drafted a letter 
to be presented to city officials and the bus company demanding improvements in 
the treatment of black passengers, but not calling for an end to segregation.141 Their 
demands were not radical. While segregation was the heart of the problem on 
Montgomery buses, it was not the central concern for all black leadership in the 
December of 1955. The MIA was not demanding desegregation but rather for 
courtesy from the bus drivers, a change to the seating policy that maintained 
segregation but worked on a first-come first-served basis, and the employment of 
African American drivers to service the predominately African American sections of 
Montgomery.142 The omission of any reference to Jim Crow segregation in the letter 
is telling. Their demands demonstrated the settled and largely uncontested nature 
of segregation within Montgomery’s community in 1955. They threatened drastic 
measures such as the boycotting of public transportation, but were not calling for 
anything that would appear to be drastic requests. This could be seen as both 
pragmatic and radical. The African American community in wanting their demands 
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met, did not seek a sudden upheaval of white power and white authority. They 
wanted instead slight changes to the existing system of segregation, and were 
willing to work within Jim Crow to improve their lives.  Segregation was in fact not 
the focal concern of the MIA at the beginning of the boycott; abuse of black 
passengers was. As the MIA explained, black passengers, “have, at various times, 
been pushed around, embarrassed, threatened, intimidated and abused” by white 
drivers.143 Violence often came indirectly as was the case with one African American 
mother and passenger of the City Bus Lines would experience. According to the MIA: 
One Negro mother, with two small children in her arm, put them on 
the front seat while she opened her purse for her fare. The driver 
ordered her to take the children from the seat, and without giving her 
the chance to place the children elsewhere, lunged the vehicle 
forward, causing the small children to be thrown into the aisle of the 
bus.144 
Stopping these abuses was more important to the MIA than challenging segregation 
head on, and so they were willing to make demands for rules that would not 
drastically change those in existence. The MIA demanded, “seating of Negro 
passengers from rear to front, and white passengers from front to rear on ‘first-
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come-first-serve’ basis with no seats reserved for any race.”145 African Americans 
would still be seated in the back of the bus and whites in the front. The only real 
change would be that African Americans would not be asked to stand for whites, 
something that was already supposed to be enforced by the current law.146 The 
MIA’s demands, while certainly pragmatic in their desire for actual and immediate 
change, were certainly also radical. These demands were voiced by African 
Americans, and called for a change in behavior from whites, specifically whites in 
power positions, as well as demanding whites relinquish some of their authority 
over space. This is the most radical of the demands made by the MIA. If drivers 
could not demand that African American passengers stand for white ones, then 
black passengers would have authority over the spaces in which they sat, and their 
own bodies.  
The impinging of movement and mobility was one of the major issued faced 
by Montgomery’s black community, and whites were the ones with nearly full 
authority over space, and the defining of acceptable movement through those 
spaces. The space of the bus, like streetcars and railroads before, was legally 
dominated by whites, who dictated where African Americans could reside as 
passengers.147 This authority was supposed to have its limits. While Rosa Parks 
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legally was within her right to refuse to move as she was sitting in a section that was 
supposed to work under the first-come first-served rule, the fact that she was black 
trumped the law.148 Within the domain of the bus, the bus driver held ultimate 
authority, backed up by police if necessary.  
 While the MIA’s demands would not require much action from whites, they 
could serve as a symbol of power. The MIA, a black organized and black operated 
group sought to dictate to whites what behavior was appropriate. This was atypical. 
Whites predominately wrote the laws, whites overwhelmingly held political office, 
and whites made up the majority of law enforcement.149 The MIA’s letter was 
assuredly radical for the time, and while it did not call for a permanent shift in any 
of these power hierarchies, it did serve as a moment of empowerment for the black 
community of Montgomery. Thus simultaneously radical and pragmatic their 
demands spurred a movement that would not simply disappear when whites 
refused.  
The MIA’s lack of demanding desegregation held ramifications on a larger 
scale. In fact segregation was a main point of contention between the MIA and the 
NAACP in the early stages of the boycott. In a letter to William C. Patton, a field 
secretary for the NAACP, Roy Wilkins, the recently appointed executive secretary of 
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the NAACP, stated that, “Obviously when our national programs call for abolishing 
segregation and our lawyers are fighting on that basis…we could not enter an 
Alabama case asking merely for more polite segregation.”150  If the MIA wanted legal 
and financial backing from the NAACP, they needed to push for complete 
desegregation of the buses, a decision that was made much easier after Montgomery 
officials refused the MIA’s initial demands. The MIA, WPC, NAACP and all other 
members of the blossoming boycott would demand the desegregation of the 
Montgomery’s buses. 
The MIA, the WPC, and the NAACP were not content to simply make demands 
of the bus lines and the city. They planned on backing them up too. They decided to 
go about printing more leaflets, distributing them again around the community as a 
means of organizing a mass protest and boycott of the buses.151 One line of the 
leaflets printed again by Jo Ann Robinson read, “Don’t ride the buses to work, to 
town, to school, or any where on Monday. If you work, take a cab, or share a ride, or 
walk.”152 This line would come to sum up the three major forms of transportation 
that would be used, and noted the leadership’s understanding that walking, while a 
possibility for some, was not going to be viable for many in Montgomery’s black 
community. Most African Americans could not walk to work, to school, or to do 
errands. This led to the MIA’s organization of a complex and highly structured 
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system centered around transportation, and more specifically, the automobile. They 
started a carpool. 
 A common adage for judging the importance of one factor among many is to 
“follow the money.” Over the year-long boycott the MIA money went to the carpool 
more than any other budget item.153 The MIA spent $5,998.33 on gas, oil, tires and 
tags, $4,537.03 on drivers and dispatchers, $733.73 on auto parts and repairs to 
carpool vehicles, and $163 on fines and penalties all totaling in $11,432.09 spent on 
the carpool. This was the budget for just one month.154 This total was $5,000 more 
than any other sector of expenditures per month, marking the deep significance of 
the carpool in the MIA’s eyes. They dedicated a majority of their resources to 
keeping the carpool going because they knew it was the most important sustaining 
the boycott. But how did this spending materialize on the ground for the carpoolers?  
On January 24, 1956, eight weeks into the boycott, a Montgomery police 
officer noted in a memo to the police chief, that one driver pulled over, John H. 
Garrison received free gas from Oliver’s service station.155 This service station also 
happened to be one of those that received a check from the MIA as recorded by 
police on January 16th.156 Similar to Oliver’s service station, within the first three 
months of the boycott more than ten service stations were receiving weekly checks 
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clear majority of the police department’s attention and resources. 
156 The Montgomery Police Department “Memo to Solicitor Thetford” January 16th 1956. (RPMA) 
67 
 
 
 
 
from the MIA covering the costs of carpoolers’ gas, maintenance, and repairs.157 The 
MIA was paying the tab for the carpoolers. The MIA either prepaid for gas, or the 
service station kept track of the amount owed, which the MIA covered later. The 
cars were at the center of an intricate economic web that pooled money both from 
the local and national community supporting the MIA, spread it out to pro-boycott 
and predominately black automobile businesses, and then benefited the boycotters 
through the dispersal of funds through the form of gasoline. This web made the 
carpools an affordable alternative to the buses.158 Furthermore the MIA ensured 
accessibility to the carpools by having thirty-three separate dispatch locations and 
forty pick up stations across the city that ran on a time schedule and a calling 
system.159 Dispatchers received calls and had the nearest dispatch stations send a 
car to pick passengers up creating a system that functioned well enough to keep 
those in need of transportation off the buses. This system was a complex, massive, 
and organized network that kept hundreds of cars fueled, the riders mobile, and the 
buses empty. Hundreds of cars, even more hundreds of drivers, and thousands of 
passengers made up this carpool.160 
The night of Garrison’s traffic stop police sent officers to try and gain 
information from a mass meeting held at the Bula Baptist Church, and noted in their 
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Memo to the police chief outlining the meeting that, “There was about 500 Cars [sic] 
parked near this church last night.”161 Similarly throughout the boycott the police 
recorded over 300 different vehicles that they stopped, all of which participated in 
the carpool.162 The MIA’s fundraising abilities, and coordination were on display 
here as it took large sums of money, and supreme organization to keep such a large 
number of cars operating in the carpool. The African Americans of Montgomery 
became masters of pooling and systematizing resources pertaining to the 
technological system of the automobile. These tasks were not easily executed, and 
those operating, running, and organizing the carpool needed keen managerial skills. 
Their abilities to fundraise, organize, and construct a mass public transportation 
system, paired with a detailed knowledge of the law allowed the boycotters to avoid 
police efforts to dismantle the carpool. 
The MIA’s complex methods of paying gas stations with donated money, then 
allowing carpoolers to receive free gas, allowed them to circumvent a law on the 
books that made any unlicensed taxicab service illegal. The boycotters were made 
well aware through mass meetings dispersing legal information from the NAACP 
that the police could arrest any driver who accepted money from a passenger. Had a 
driver accepted money, he could be charged with running an illegal taxi service.163  
A taxicab could be defined as any vehicle that charged a fare to passengers. If any 
car is deemed to be a taxicab it the driver then came under an extensive set of 
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regulations including the need for a state taxicab license, a special driver’s 
registration and license, and more poignantly must be segregated and not deny 
passengers. This meant that if the police could prove the carpool was in fact a 
taxicab service, they could bring the carpool under state regulation and effectively 
abolish the carpool. Furthermore they could arrest and fine every driver of the 
carpool for illegally operating a taxicab. In this way the police could end the carpool 
and effectively end the boycott. This was the police’s hope. Throughout the entire 
boycott police tried to prove that drivers were accepting donations directly. This 
was the reason for the MIA’s payment systems. In this way the African American 
community of Montgomery was able to pool their money and financially support the 
boycott, and pro-boycott businesses without breaking any laws.164 The service 
stations were crucial to the success of the carpools, and therefore the boycott, and 
the businessmen who owned these stations took active steps to assist the carpools.  
One such businessman, Fletcher Smith, was an African American born and 
raised in Montgomery. Smith owned the College Hill Service Station and not only 
worked with the MIA to pay for carpoolers’ gas, but also provided a vehicle to assist 
in the carpool. On January 24th police officers pulled over Burl Mack Averhart, a 
reverend and active boycotter in a Willy’s station wagon. The police recorded that 
Averhart, “drives this station wagon all day for Fletcher Smith owner of the College 
Hill Service Station. Hauls negroes all day. Fills up with gas anytime he needs it. 
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Made (2) trips in and out of this pickup station.”165 Smith was a black businessman 
dedicated to the boycott efforts, and used his successes as a businessman to make 
his work vehicle available for the carpool. The boycott was not going to work 
without carpoolers; the carpoolers were not going anywhere without vehicles; and 
the vehicles were useless without someone filling their tanks. Smith filled several of 
these crucial roles. He provided a vehicle, and gasoline and could afford to do so in 
part because of the increased business generated by the boycott itself. Between 
December 1st and March 7th the MIA paid Smith $419.48.166 This money went to gas 
for the cars in the carpool, and was what allowed for Burl Mack Averhart to fill up 
“any time he needs it.” Not only was the black community of Montgomery 
supporting black businesses in the form of service stations, they were also bringing 
new income to those businesses. Furthermore, black business owners served an 
activist role to better the lives of their community, and it all centered on the 
automobile. When cars broke, drivers needed them serviced. When the tank was 
empty, it needed to be filled. And when the MIA needed to buy station wagons, they 
turned to car dealers.   
Along with buying gasoline, the MIA used the pooled money to purchase 
dozens of station wagons. These cars were typically brand new Chevrolet station 
wagons, and while Chevrolet is a blue-collar company, these specific station wagons 
were fully loaded with numerous available options. This included power steering, 
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Powerglide automatic transmissions, turn signals, heaters, and the V8 engines.167 
The police officers stated it best, “in other words they paid several hundred dollars 
more for the wagons they bought…”168 The MIA and leadership of the boycott were 
concerned with more than just the utility of the station wagons. They wanted 
vehicles that could give many passengers rides, but they also wanted them to be as 
easy to drive as possible. The power steering and automatic transmissions made 
operating the vehicles enormously easier than station wagons without these 
options. The automatic transmissions particularly added to the ease of operation as 
the driver would not need to know how to use a clutch and therefore would not stall 
the car while in operation. The turn signals allowed the drivers to only need to know 
how to operate a simple lever rather than remember the hand signals that were 
otherwise required when turning. The powerful V8 engines allowed the cars to 
easily haul large loads of passengers, an aspect that was important to the success of 
the carpool. The V8 engines were an investment to insure that each car could haul as 
many passengers as possible increasing the efficiency of the station wagons. The 
heaters while not making the car necessarily easier to drive, made them far more 
comfortable for both drivers and passengers in the cold winter weather of 
Montgomery. Making the cars safer and easier to drive meant that drivers could 
volunteer without having large amounts of expertise or experience driving. This also 
meant that drivers were less likely to place themselves in situations that made them 
open to tickets. If a driver were to stall the car in the middle of the road, fail to use 
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hand turn signals, or impede traffic the driver could be subject to tickets from the 
police. By paying more for these options the MIA was investing in the longevity of 
the carpool and thus the boycott.169 
These station wagons came to be called “rolling churches” as they each bore 
bumper stickers of the respective churches that purchased them.170 A church bought 
a vehicle through the donations made directly to that church, or more commonly the 
car was purchased in a church’s name, and the MIA later reimbursed that specific 
church.171 In this way, the MIA could again keep from breaking any laws regarding 
illegal taxi services. If the vehicles were all in the name of churches, or religious 
leaders they were not considered owned by one business or organization. Had they 
all been owned by the MIA, the police might have had an avenue to prosecute the 
MIA leadership. The black citizens of Montgomery successfully and rapidly armed 
their bus boycott with the tools required, and the streets filled with automobiles.172 
For police this only cemented their continued surveillance efforts. 
The experience of driving and riding in the carpools was a drastic change 
from the transportation of Montgomery buses. The passengers of the carpools were 
not subject to racialized abuses that threatened them on the buses. By removing 
themselves from the buses, the drivers and passengers of the carpools were seizing 
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power where they previously were denied. Like the jitney buses forty years earlier, 
the carpool arguably increased segregation. Black drivers and black passengers 
overwhelmingly dominated the cars of the carpool, leaving the buses with 
exclusively white drivers and white passengers.173 And again recalling the jitney 
experiment, this segregation was no longer on white terms. Whites had previously 
won control over transportation and mobility and established the shape and form 
segregation would take: white drivers with white passengers in the front of buses, 
and black passengers in the back of them as subjects of white authority just like on 
Gilded Age railroads, and turn of the century streetcars. Whites told African 
Americans where they were allowed to be.174 But in the new segregation of the 
carpools, like the black run jitneys before them, African Americans decided where to 
be. White authority, represented by the police, wanted to get African Americans out 
of the carpools and back onto the buses. Authority over physical and social space 
was a cornerstone in the great cathedral of white supremacy, and any changes 
threatened the status quo. 
Cars not only changed the spaces of segregation, but also served as tools of 
change for spatial conceptualizations. Cars provided security, and with security 
came a shift in individuals’ understanding of actual physical space. Cars shortened 
distance. Perceptions of spaces were continually shifting and as one boycotter, John 
F. Sawyer Jr., explained, nightfall dramatically changed these conceptualizations of 
space and time. Sawyer walked to Alabama State University during the day in order 
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to get to classes, but at night used the carpool system. Sawyer perceived the distance 
from his home during the day to be short enough to walk, but the danger that night 
brought made it feel much longer. This lengthened space was “too far to walk” and 
that is when Sawyer used the carpool as a tool of transportation, and also safety.175 
The distance between the same two points shifted from being short enough to walk, 
to too long to walk due to nightfall, and then back to  a safe distance when Sawyer 
rode in a car.176 Cars had the power to change an individual’s perceptions of space, 
provide safety, aid the boycott, and ultimately serve their designed purpose of 
transportation.  
The African Americans of Montgomery were not seeking to overthrow white 
supremacy over all social spaces. As clearly stated in their demands to the city they 
were not boycotting to rid Montgomery of segregated pools, theaters, or water 
fountains; just buses.177 But even then, any contention over space was not going to 
be won by African Americans easily, and the whites seeking to maintain Jim Crow 
were not going to give in without a fight. In Montgomery this resistance came in the 
forms of the Ku Klux Klan, an organization that terrorized African Americans for 
decades, the White Citizen’s Council, a volunteer organization whose members often 
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were also part of the Klan, and most publicly, consistently and principally, the 
Montgomery Police Department.178  
White authority was faced with a problem. African Americans were 
challenging white power, and the Montgomery Police Department was not willing to 
let that challenge go unanswered. While it is not clear if there were any African 
American members of the Montgomery Police Department, the police most certainly 
acted against the boycott and specifically against the carpool seeking to curb any 
success gained by the civil rights activists in Montgomery. A challenge to 
segregation was a challenge to the law and therefore a challenge to police authority 
and white supremacy. Jim Crow laws forced the white supremacy agenda upon law 
enforcement, and while many officers likely were in agreement with this agenda and 
welcomed its reign over law enforcement, even those who might disagree were 
legally obligated to uphold white supremacy. They began a campaign against the 
boycott, but before anything else was to be done, they needed information.  The 
Montgomery Improvement Association was careful about what they shared with the 
Montgomery public and officials. Aware of the power of information, the MIA 
disseminated their demands to the public, but did not disperse full information 
regarding their plans for boycotting the buses in the same manner.179 While the MIA 
made their goals clear via paper leaflets and a formal letter to the mayor of 
Montgomery, W.A. Gayle who consistently encouraged the Montgomery Police 
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Department’s surveillance efforts, they remained insular when it came to the 
strategies they would employ to subvert the bus system.180 This information was 
reserved to the mass meetings that were organized at various black churches within 
the Montgomery community. The First Baptist Church, and the Holt Street Baptist 
Church primarily hosted these meetings.181 This allowed the MIA and the NAACP to 
organize, and disperse information within their own community. This information 
included instructions from the NAACP on how to avoid arrest, “pep talks” from black 
ministers, and any other pertinent information that was called for on a day-by-day 
basis.182 If the streets and parking lots of Montgomery became the spaces for 
pooling of cars, the churches became the spaces for the pooling of legal and social 
resources. The churches were also spaces in which African Americans held 
authority, and they could exclude the prying eyes and ears of Montgomery’s police 
officers. 
The insular nature of the MIA meant that police could not readily gain access 
to the MIA’s plans, something that they themselves recognized would be a major 
obstacle to the campaign to get African Americans back onto the buses. This led the 
Montgomery Police Department to pool resources themselves as they organized a 
formal investigation into the MIA and other bodies associated with the boycott.183 
While the NAACP was at the legal forefront of the boycott, preparing a case to be 
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tried before the Supreme Court, the MIA was the primary face of the boycott, making 
them the primary target for the police. This investigation quickly turned into what 
today is called a task force, as police pooled resources, officers, and willing civilians 
to focus their attention on the bus boycott.  
Early in the investigation the police were desperate to obtain any 
information they could get their hands on. Police questioned members of the black 
community, hoping to glean some sense of the organization and plans of the boycott, 
and they were willing to listen to virtually anyone, including an anonymous 
informant described as X2 an “informant” who was recognizably drunk and 
disorderly during the police’s interaction and most likely sought financial gains from 
the police who were offering rewards for information.184 The meeting with  X2 
indicates that police were willing to talk to virtually anyone, and desperate for 
information. 
As early as January 13, 1956, only a little over a month into the boycott, 
police officers started systematically checking the bank accounts of members of the 
MIA and the Alabama Council on Human Relations (ACHR) including leader Robert 
E. Hughes who previously served as an intermediary who facilitated the first 
meeting between the MIA and city officials.185 The ACHR was an offshoot of the 
Commission on Interracial Cooperation, a national group that as early as 1919 was 
organized in response to intense racial violence faced by African Americans 
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following World War I.186 The ACHR largely consisted of the African Americans who 
sought the most pragmatic of solutions. They were the ones who pushed strongest 
for the MIA to make their initial demands tamer, and prior to the bus boycott were 
the body that typically raised issues of the black community that did not seek to 
challenge white supremacy.187 However as it became clear the boycott was not an 
ephemeral attempt to secure civil rights but rather a dedicated campaign to force 
the desegregation of the buses with the mass of Montgomery’s black population 
involved, the ACHR then worked in tandem with the MIA to keep the carpools 
rolling. The initial facilitation seems to have been what made Hughes a target for 
police surveillance.188 The police not only checked Hughes’ personal bank accounts, 
those shared with his wife, but also the accounts that Hughes held under the name 
of the Alabama Council on Human Relations. The bank that held these records, The 
First National, also gave the investigators information regarding Martin Luther King 
Jr.’s bank accounts, but explained that they did not have the information police 
wanted regarding the accounts of E.D. Nixon and the NAACP.189  
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Police were quickly placing emphasis upon donations and funds that were 
held by leadership of the boycott. If they could find the money, they could also find 
where the money was going. Within the January 13th memo, regarding Hughes’ 
family account information, police reported that, “They now have $12.00 in the 
account. The most they have ever had in it was $339.00 They also have a checking 
account for the Ala. Council on Human Relations…It now has $225.00 in it. The most 
it has ever had in it was $340.00.” The memo similarly explains Dr. King’s account 
balance and the max balance, as well as stating that King primarily deposits small 
checks. This fixation on the movement of money does not have a clear explanation 
until later in the memo the police note that the staff at the bank made it known to 
officers that, “the NAACP had gone to the Bosswell Motor Co. and had put in an 
order for 12 large station wagons. We checked on this and this Motor Co. has been 
asked to bid on from six to twelve station wagons, we haven’t checked yet but 
assume that some of the other Motor CO. [sic] has been asked to give a bid also.” For 
the Montgomery officers, the movement of money was tied directly to the acquiring 
of cars. This became a trend in police searches of bank records, and follow-ups to 
car dealers and other businesses associated with automobiles. This link led officers 
to focus on just that: they became obsessed with cars.190   
The MIA was not just content with organizing the carpool and funding it. 
They continued to purchase vehicles for the carpool throughout the boycott and 
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shopped around in search of the best deals that they could get.191 Furthermore they 
were seemingly always one step ahead of the police. At the mass meetings they 
knew that police might well try to use the taxi-cab law to go after the boycott and 
they were correct. 
Following their investigation into Robert E. Hughes’ private bank accounts 
the police immediately set to establish what would become the center piece of 
police activity against the boycott: the regular surveillance campaign and 
harassment of black drivers. Police placed patrol cars at the stops of the carpools. 
On January 23, 1956, police pulled over twelve vehicles, all driven by African 
Americans and packed with African American passengers. They questioned the 
drivers, took down the make and model and license plates of the cars, recorded the 
addresses of the drivers and specifically focused on finding out if any passengers 
were paying for their rides.192 One driver, David Harris, stated that the only people 
in the car were his family. This seems a benign inclusion, however this was a 
common tactic employed by the carpoolers. In attempts to keep themselves from 
arousing suspicion or further harassment from the police, carpoolers often claimed 
that their passengers were all related to the driver, possibly exploiting racist white 
perceptions that all African Americans look alike.193 
In addition to collecting information from cars they pulled over, police also 
issued numerous tickets to carpoolers, hoping to financially hurt the boycott, and 
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also arrested drivers on unfounded bases. Martin Luther King Jr. explained that 
police issued drivers with, “…a series of arrests for minor and often imaginary traffic 
violations. People who had never received a ticket were booked, and on several 
occasions taken to jail.”194 Jo Ann Robinson further explained that, “many of those 
policemen would just give hundreds and hundreds of tickets every day to people 
who were not violating any traffic laws.”195 While this tactic was meant to deter the 
carpoolers, the MIA countered the police’s aggressive ticketing and arrests by using 
the money they were collecting to aid drivers who received tickets, establishing a 
budget specifically for “fines and penalties.”196 The ticketing, while certainly another 
obstacle for the boycotters, would not end the carpool. But the police continued 
their ticketing and surveillance efforts.  
On a nearly daily basis police conducted surveillance at various carpool hubs 
and, “stopped every car that had a load of negroes.”197 Police were not pulling 
drivers over because of infractions, not pulling them over for breaking the law, but 
pulling them over because they were black. By pulling these drivers over police 
were using the driver’s race as reason enough to stop their vehicle and conduct a 
search. No warrants were issued, and no probable cause established other than the 
driver’s complexion. These cars full of black passengers were a common sight on the 
streets of Montgomery during the year-long boycott.198 If the police saw any car full 
of black people, it was reason enough to pull the car over, check the license of the 
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driver, record the license plate number and make and model of the car as well as ask 
the driver and passengers questions, seeking to gain further information about the 
carpool. But they couldn’t prove that anyone was paying for their rides, and 
therefore couldn’t shut the carpools down. The police lacked the power to stop the 
carpools, and the carpoolers knew it. The carpoolers consistently based their 
interactions with the police on the knowledge being fed to them by the NAACP at the 
mass meetings. They knew not to volunteer information and knew specifically not to 
let the officers in on how the money got from the MIA to the service stations. Despite 
being systematically racially profiled, ticketed and fined the drivers and passengers 
alike kept their composure and did not provide incriminating information to the 
police.199 It was a rare moment in Montgomery’s history. One in which white 
supremacy was showing signs of wear. The threat of power slipping through the 
fingers of white authority pushed police past surveillance and ticketing. They sought 
legal advice in order to take back the power they were loosing, to find or create a 
means to return to the status quo, before that early December morning when the 
busses first ran empty of black passengers..  
In May of 1956 police met with Mr. Burchfield and Mr. Brooks from the 
Public Service Commission (PSC), a quasi-official community organization that 
legally aided in fighting the boycott.200 During this meeting the police recorded that, 
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“They stated they were ready to work with us on anything and as long as it took to 
get the results that we’re after. We talked about these station-wagons that was [sic] 
being used to haul negro’s back and forth to work.”201 The police conducted this 
outreach as a means of obtaining further information and aid against the boycott. 
The topic of most interest, as usual for the Montgomery police during 1956, was 
cars. The police and the members of the Public Service Commission wanted the 
boycotters out of the station wagons and back onto the buses, but once again they 
were faced with the reality that they did not hold the legal power to realize this 
desire. The police explained, “We [the police and PSC members] checked the law 
books, both city and state and we could not find any law that we could work on 
unless we could prove that the negro passengers were paying to ride these station 
wagons.”202 The police were searching for anything they could use to break the 
boycott. The only law that could conceivably be used against the carpool was that 
taxicab registration, but police failed thus far to prove the passengers were paying 
fares. The police were faced with the reality that the black community discovered a 
means of subverting white authority, white-controlled segregation, and white 
supremacy and the police had no idea what to do to stop it. Their desperation once 
again showed as they searched for some form of power they could deploy or exploit 
to break up the carpools, and it did not matter if the boycott was not breaking any 
laws. It was as if the police were operating under the assumption that anything that 
threatened the status quo, anything that could take power out of the hands of white 
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authority, and anything that they just flat out did not like, was therefore illegal, or 
should be. [In a sense they were operating on the generally accepted notion that the 
intent of the law can be a guide to interpreting its application to novel situations.  In 
this way their efforts might be read as acknowledging that the intent of the laws in 
Montgomery were, indeed, to keep blacks suppressed and support white 
supremacy.] The police refused to accept that power could be taken from them 
within the system they helped build. The carpool was operating well within the law 
that had been established, and had for so long helped maintain white supremacy. 
While boycotters built upon knowledge gained through the experience with jitneys, 
police clearly had not, however the same tactics used against the jitneys could not 
succeed against the carpools in large part due to the Brown v. Board decision and in 
part because of the prevalence of the automobile. The cars used in the carpools 
were, for the majority, unmodified, unlike the jitneys used decades before. 
The police did not stop searching for a means to pull the wheels off the 
carpool, and understood that they were not experts in the field of interpreting laws 
to repress black power. That was a job for a lawyer. With this in mind police officers 
accompanied by a member of the PSC, drove to Birmingham to meet with a lawyer 
named Maurice Bishop.203 Bishop confirmed the officers’ fears explaining that he, 
“read our [Montgomery’s] city code and that he could not find anything in the code 
that would be of much help.”204 The police did not desire to simply enforce the law, 
rather they hoped to bend the law to their desire. The police whose job is not 
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supposed to entail arresting or fining those they simply wish to, but rather enforce 
the law and arrest those who break it, once again demonstrated that they viewed 
their job in other terms. For the police officers in 1956 Montgomery, their job was to 
maintain white supremacy, and they did not stop trying to do their job. Police 
officers and Bishop colluded in order to design a means to indirectly keep the 
carpools from continuing.205 Bishop explained that the “City Commissioners could 
meet and pass an ordinance requiring any person or person’s using a vehicle to haul 
more than (5) or more than (6) persons to show proof of a certain amount of 
liability insurance.”206 Bishop inspired police to look further into insurance as a 
means of stopping the carpool. If they could revoke the registration of the cars, they 
in theory could arrest the drivers for operating a vehicle without insurance and thus 
they in theory could stop the carpool. 
The police continued on their quest to end the boycott. Police brought 
private white businesses into the fold and took an activist stance to end the boycott. 
Car insurance became part of the focus for police. They met with Richard Hanna, a 
good friend of one of the police officers who was “connected with the Lawyer’s 
insurance Co.”207 After talking to Mr. Hanna, police learned that thirteen of the 
station wagons had insurance policies held by Lawyer’s Insurance Co. Mr. Hanna 
also informed police that he and the rest of Lawyer’s Insurance Co. would agree to 
not write any more insurance policies for the station wagons. Not only did Hanna 
agree to not write any more policies, but he also decided to cancel the existing 
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policies. Other insurance companies followed suit, and as Martin Luther King Jr. put 
it, “Insurance agents decided, almost overnight, to refuse to insure out station 
wagons, contending that the risk was too high. The liability insurance on our station 
wagons was cancelled no less than four times within four months. (We had no 
trouble with the collision insurance because it was a negro company.)”208 Clearly 
money talked in Montgomery, Alabama. Although the Lawyer’s Insurance Co. and 
other like it were willing to stop issuing and even cancel insurance to the boycotters, 
they initially seemed to have no problem selling the first policies. It is unlikely that 
the owners and employees of the companies suddenly changed their feelings about 
the boycott. What is more likely is that the companies were willing to take anyone’s 
money for policies, including boycotters who they did not politically agree with. 
Money was power. African Americans used money to change the rules of social 
interaction, and as King stated, they drew further power through working with 
black owned businesses. If the black community brought enough money to the table, 
some conservative members of the white community were willing to work with 
them. The police however took an active role in trying to get insurance companies to 
cease writing policies, which could then provide police with a means to end the 
boycott. Insurance was necessary for vehicles to legally drive on the streets, and 
while King was told the policies were cancelled due to the risk being “too high” it is 
no coincidence that the string of cancellations directly followed the police’s visit to 
Mr. Hanna. Overnight insurance companies got on board with the police. 
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The carpool was not the only place that the automobile was employed to get 
black members of Montgomery’s community to and from work. Support at times 
came from white wealthy women, who did not want to loose their black maids and 
help.  Virginia Durr, a rare white supporter of the movement, and friend to many of 
the boycott’s leaders explained, “The mayor of the town issued an order that all 
black maids must be dismissed in order to break the boycott. Well, their reply was, 
‘Tell the mayor to come and do my work for me, then.’ So white women went and 
got the black women in the car.”209 This was a new twist that neither the mayor, the 
police, or the leaders of the boycott had seen coming.210  
During the post-war period of the 1950s consumerism had encouraged 
households to purchase his and her cars, and now the “her” cars were going 
downtown and aiding the boycott. White women used their cars to purposefully 
help themselves, but in turn helped the boycott as well. Loosing household labor 
was significant enough for some white women to break from the white norm of not 
assisting African Americans with transportation during the boycott.211 For African 
Americans, the motives of the wealthy white women did not matter: these women 
utilized their cars to bring a new source of transportation to the movement, and 
used the freedom of their cars to ignore and even challenge prominent male figures’ 
desires. Often the wealthy white women would make excuses for their actions 
saying, “The bus broke down and there was no other way the help could get 
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here.”212 However, these excuses were simply made to save face because according 
to Jo Ann Robinson, “Not a single maid was riding those buses.”213 Some white 
women truly did believe these excuses though. Marian Young, a black maid was 
asked by her white employer in front of Virginia Durr, whether Young or her family 
had anything to do with the boycott. Young replied that not a single one of them was 
part of the boycott and didn’t support it. When the employer left, Durr turned to 
Young and exclaimed that she very well knew just about every one of her family had 
an active role in the boycott. Young then replied, “Well you know, when you have 
your hand near the lion’s mouth, its best to just pat the lion on the head. Besides, 
you know Mrs. Durr, I didn’t want to stop getting rides in that fancy Cadillac.”214 
These white women were exempt from police surveillance. That fact that their 
transportation of their black maids was largely self-serving meant that police 
officers had no reason to stop and harass these white women. Furthermore these 
women, being part of the white community and typically as Young’s employers was, 
against the boycott itself, nevertheless their need for black maids outweighed their 
desire to maintain segregation. 
 Despite all of the activism, and continued surveillance and harassment of 
carpoolers, the police could not get the cars off the roads. The boycotters had set up 
an entirely separate transportation system that was highly organized and arguably 
more effective than the buses, drawing all of the income generated by black 
passengers away from the buses, and circulating it back into the black community. 
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The white-owned buses folded eventually because of the financial havoc the boycott 
was wreaking upon the bus company’s profits. Cars in the Montgomery Bus Boycott 
literally and figuratively carried the movement. Cars were utilized in many ways by 
many people, ranging from average boycotters to wealthy white housewives, and 
were the primary reason for the success of the boycott. The financial blow that the 
cars enabled led to enormous economic incentive to abandon segregation on city 
buses. Just as the jitneys of the 1910s had, the carpoolers of the boycott proved that 
cars were a viable and effective way to challenge the status quo of transportation 
culture.  
Browder v Gayle was the final blow to segregation on the Montgomery Bus 
Lines.215 The NAACP successfully petitioned the courts and brought Claudette 
Colvin’s arrest to the federal level when it reached the Supreme Court. Indeed 
Colvin’s refusal to leave her seat did not come without its fruits. Her case was the 
one that the NAACP worked on to bring to the Supreme Court in part because hers 
came prior to Rosa Parks’ and also being a child going to school made public 
transportation all the more necessary.216 In accord with the Brown v. Board decision 
two years earlier, the court ruled that bus segregation violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment. With a federal ruling that specifically applied to Montgomery bus 
segregation, along with the Montgomery City Lines’ desire to integrate in order to 
keep the business from filing for bankruptcy, legal segregation officially ended on 
December 20th 1956. Montgomery’s black community filled the seats, both in the 
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front and back, of the Montgomery City Lines buses. On that day African Americans 
and whites sat alongside one another and Martin Luther King Jr., who as the 
president of the MIA newspapers made the figurehead of the boycott, declared the 
boycott a success.217 The boycott officially lasted 381 days surviving police 
surveillance, mass ticketing, violence and intimidation via the Klan typically in the 
form of church bombings, mass arrests, and daily challenges too numerous to list. 
The most important tool that kept the boycott alive was the automobile. 
Despite Browder v. Gayle, and despite the integration of Montgomery’s buses, 
the struggle wasn’t over just because the boycott was over. Montgomery did not 
suddenly become a paradise of racial understanding and equality. In fact directly 
following the integration of the buses, Montgomery experienced a spree of 
seemingly unconnected violent crimes aimed toward buses and black motorists.218  
On the same day that the supreme court ruling was handed down making bus 
segregation illegal, B.D. Lambert, a black preacher and active member in the boycott, 
filed a complaint with the police department alleging that a motorcycle police officer 
threw acid onto Lambert’s brand new 1957 Mercury. Throwing acid on a car does 
not impinge on the use of the vehicle. It still drives, still turns, still can bring people 
to and fro. But it does damage the image of the vehicle, and image was a major 
selling and buying point for the 1957 Mercury. The Lamberts likely held a sense of 
pride owning brand new Mercury. Cars have long been a status symbol, but they 
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were even more meaningful in 1956 Montgomery as they were the tools used to 
work towards equality under the law, and a Mercury was not considered a blue 
collar car, adding to the sense of accomplishment that likely came with the purchase 
of the vehicle. The Lamberts were also likely one of the first families to own a 1957 
Mercury in Montgomery. The winter of 1956 was the beginning of the new car 
season, so it is fairly remarkable that the lamberts were able to purchase their car. A 
1957 Mercury bears a sense of presence with it’s tapered creased fins, skylight dual 
curve windshield, extra wide chromed grill, push button transmission, projectile 
side theme, large dual squared bumpers, v-angle tail-lights.219 The thing was sleek. 
And the Lamberts’ mercury was now marred.  
The police went to Lambert’s house, inspected the car finding that some 
substance had ruined the paint on a portion of the car, questioned the Lamberts and 
then dropped the case with no further investigation.220 While it may never be 
known whether an officer actually did such an act, it is difficult to conceive of a 
reason Lambert would make up such a tale. Assuming that the report was truthful, 
the idea that the same day that control over black mobility was taken away from the 
Montgomery City Council the police retaliated on a citizen in such a way 
demonstrates the clear frustration that came along with the loss of authority on the 
police’s part, and cars were clearly still seen as a source of power and as a symbol of 
African Americans’ success. 
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Days following the acid incident another act of aggression and violence 
targeted black motorists. On December 24th following the first integrated busing in 
Montgomery, Henry Jackson Sr. and his family, while driving home from picking 
their son up from jail, were engaged by two cars full of angry, armed, violent white 
males. Jackson was forced by gunpoint to pull the car over and then his daughter-in-
law was dragged from the car and beaten as the fourteen white men brandished 
pistols and shotguns repeatedly threatening Jackson and the other black men in the 
car. One of the white men then yelled, “You niggers can’t ride the bus with the white 
folks and you can’t ride a car around here.” Jackson was then struck over the head 
opening a cut and the family fled.221 The law and police failed to keep segregation on 
the buses, so those prejudiced whites who refused to accept the supreme court 
ruling took matters into their own hands. These fourteen men believed that the 
status quo of white supremacy gave them authority to intimidate and attack African 
Americans in the pursuit of preserving that same white supremacy.  Following the 
end of the boycott and carpool, cars were still seen by both the black and white 
community as objects of power, a perception cultivated nationally by automobile 
advertising.222 The threat of violence to black automobile drivers specifically 
signifies that these white men, in attempting to preserve white power and white 
supremacy, sought to take the power of the automobile away from the black 
community. Furthermore they clearly demonstrated their desire to maintain 
segregation and even bring it to a higher level on the buses and affirmed that if the 
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law would not enforce segregation they would use violence to do so. These men did 
not contend that African Americans could not sit where they pleased on the buses, 
they demanded that they not use the buses at all. While the buses had been virtually 
white only for an entire year, it was by black choice and design. In this case the 
violent whites were now attempting to bar African Americans from the space of the 
bus entirely. They wanted to maintain the absence of African Americans on the 
buses, but wanted to do so on their own terms, not on those of the black community. 
Violence was going to be their tool to reestablish white supremacy on the buses. 
Violence was going to be the tool with which the whites attempted to reclaim 
authority over black mobility, over mental, social, and physical space. Similar white 
reactions proved again and again to be a prominent factor in Montgomery in the 
following days, weeks, and months.223  
Violent attacks escalated quickly. On December 26th, following the Jackson’s 
assault gunshots rang out on the streets of Montgomery two times, all directed 
toward the buses. The first of these came from a shotgun that shattered a bus 
window while the bus was in operation.224 Behind that window was a young black 
girl whose name is unknown. While the bus driver, a white man named H.L. Warren, 
asked that all four of the black passengers on the bus write their names down so 
they could be contacted later, all refused. This is likely due to the fear and distrust of 
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the police created in part by the year-long police campaign against the carpool. For 
the black citizens of Montgomery, it was clear which side the police were on, still.225  
The next attack came two days after.226 Another shooting at another bus; this 
time someone was actually shot.227 Rosa Jordan, a 22 year old black woman was 
shot in the legs while eight months pregnant.228 Jordan could not have the bullet 
removed for over a month, as it was deemed too dangerous for her to have the 
surgery to extract the bullet. This was again an act of violence that was in direct 
retaliation to the bus boycott. The most extreme of the white segregationists were 
those willing to shoot at buses and bomb churches. These were more than just acts 
of violence. They were acts of terror. The goal of shooting a bus was to terrorize 
African Americans into not riding the buses at all. The whites went from trying to 
force the black community back onto the buses, to trying to force them off. When the 
law no longer provided whites the legal authority to dictate the racial division of 
space, they attempted to do so through raw power, through violent acts of 
terrorism. And under the correct assumption that white power still reigned 
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supreme, no arrests were ever made in connection to such retaliatory acts of 
terrorism.229 
Attacks continued on the buses in the form of sniper campaigns, and violence 
in Montgomery escalated with numerous bombings of black churches. Roughly two 
months following Browder v Gayle, in a letter drafted to the President Eisenhower, 
black leadership in the south requested the President to come to the south and give, 
“A major speech in a major southern city urging all southerners to abide by the 
Supreme Court’s decision as the law of the land.”230 The leaders justified their 
request explaining: 
In Alabama Christian Churches literally have been destroyed by 
dynamite and T.N.T. Numerous individuals including women have 
been beaten on the streets. The homes of Negro leaders have been 
bombed. Men and women, black and white, sitting in buses peacefully 
have been targeted by snipers. A fortnight ago a 15 year old girl was 
brutally beaten. A few days ago the legs of a woman 8 months 
pregnant were shattered by a gun...A state of terror prevails.231 
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The leaders sought out a higher authority to reestablish law. This spree of violence, 
along with the need to appeal to the president, further indicated that the 
segregationists’ saw white supremacy as more powerful than the law. The word 
spree is specifically relevant here. The immediate and intense nature of these 
violent attacks cannot be overstated. These were acts of terror directly related to 
the legal and active success of the boycott. While intimidation and bombings did 
occur during the boycott, the violence had not been this extreme, routine and 
severe. These acts were directly correlated to the Supreme Court decision and the 
integration of the buses. The buses for an entire year were devoid of black faces, and 
while integration became law, the actual space of the bus and segregation of that 
space did not experience drastic change.   
 Violence continued in Montgomery even after the pleas to Eisenhower. On 
April 16th, 1957 Montgomery police officers responded to a call regarding a fight on 
a bus. When officers arrived they discovered that a white man named James Brice 
attacked four black teenage girls with a wrench after demanding that one of the 
teenagers, Josephine Boldin “get her black ass back to where she belongs”232 Brice 
then engaged in a “tussle” with Annie Burch, one of the other teenagers, hitting her 
in the head with the wrench and wrestling on the bus floor.233 After falling out the 
front of the bus, Brice stood and shouted, “I should go get my gun and kill all you 
dam [sic] niggers.”234 When the police arrived on the scene, Brice was the only 
member of the fight still present. Police took his story down, which left out attacking 
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the girls with a wrench and threatening to kill them, and issued warrants for the 
arrest of the teenagers. Upon taking the girls’ testimonies though it became clear 
that Brice was not providing the full truth as all four girls provided similar 
testimonies. Space was clearly still being contested on the buses of Montgomery, 
however an important change took place, the officers no longer bore the power to 
arrest the four teenage girls for sitting wherever they pleased. Unlike Claudette 
Colvin and Rosa Parks, the girls were not violating any part of the law, and while 
James Brice was not content with their seating arrangements, the police could do 
nothing to stop them. Segregation, at times, however did continue in a more subtle 
form. 
After the boycott, while the Supreme Court decision made forced segregation 
illegal, in practice segregation was still alive, but only by the choice of Montgomery’s 
citizens. Bus driver H.L. Warren explained that in practice, the African American 
passengers sat in the back while the white passengers sat in the front.235 Again in 
the initial report regarding Rosa Jordan’s shooting the driver of that bus, W.H. 
Fullilove, made it clear that black passengers were in the back of the bus while white 
passengers took up the spaces in the front.236 Legal integration clearly was not equal 
to racial cohesion. The report filed by H.L. Warren was the first reported physical 
attack on buses, and the fact that he reported that all the African American 
passengers sat in the back while whites sat in the front suggests that perhaps some 
of those black passengers were not segregating out of fear but rather something 
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else. Perhaps they did not with to sit with the whites who so strongly opposed 
integration. Clearly race was still a strong dividing line. African Americans and 
whites were choosing to separate themselves on the buses, but held the power to 
make that choice. It is this power to choose that so agitated white segregationists as 
is evident through the police officer’s desperate attempts to get African Americans 
back onto the buses during the boycott. Police did not want African Americans 
opting out of segregation as dictated by whites. They previously held authority over 
space and ordained where was acceptable for African Americans and where was 
not. Montgomery was not the last instance of whites attempting to maintain this 
authority and was not the last civil rights battleground that thrust the automobile 
onto the frontlines, however it was a moment when the strategy to resist the civil 
rights movement, and the strategy to regulate black behavior changed. It was a 
moment when lynchings were largely left behind, when police incorporated new 
strategies of engaging black motorists. It was the moment that “driving while black” 
became an informal offense, one that police continued to use as reason enough to 
pull over black motorists.  
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“What went through my mind was I felt like I was in the ‘40s or the ‘50s” 
—Rodney King  
Epilogue 
 
The story of the Civil Rights movement is akin to a game of tug of war; a 
continuous and fluid give and take that saw power gained and lost by black 
communities and individuals. Following the integration of Montgomery buses the 
carpool system dissipated despite the fact that it was more efficient for 
Montgomery’s black citizens than the buses ever were. But efficient transportation 
was not the primary goal of the MIA, of Rosa Parks, Claudette Colvin, E.D. Nixon, 
Martin Luther King, the carpoolers, or any of those involved in the boycott. Their 
goal was equality. Similarly as segregation laws lost power over spaces of public 
transportation across the country, so too vanished the organized pooling of 
automobiles as a means of challenging white supremacy. Public transportation 
largely dissipated from the fight for civil rights, and while the freedom riders 
certainly tackled issues of transportation, they were aimed at interstate bus laws. 
The strategy chosen was to break the state laws and test the will of the Kennedy 
administration to enforce federal court rulings, driving integrated buses through the 
South. Carpools were not necessary, nor a viable means for challenging the laws as 
those riding the integrated buses did so voluntarily, and did not actually need to use 
interstate busing as a means of transportation. Unlike the community of 
Montgomery, it was not necessary to the riders’ daily lives to ride the buses across 
state lines. They did so purely to fight segregation, not establish a better system that 
they themselves would continue to regularly use.    
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Civil Rights Activists lost the need for black run carpools, as they turned their 
attention away from public transportation and towards other spaces controlled by 
whites such as public education.237 Integrating Central High School in Little Rock, 
Arkansas could not be done through mass automobile action. While cars could get 
the nine black children to school in relative safety, they could not keep the children 
safe once inside the physical space of the school.238 Likewise carpools could not 
theoretically aid those who marched from Selma to Montgomery in protest of Jimmy 
Lee Jackson’s slaying and the general lack of black voting rights. The power gained 
through that march was specifically drawn from the marching; from the difficulty of 
walking the fifty miles through the contested space of rural Alabama.239 The act of 
walking specifically meant something there. Carpools did not provide aid to those 
fighting for civil rights in schools and polling stations and two factors best explain 
this: the aforementioned lack of further issues pertaining to the pairing of 
segregation and public transportation, and the individualization of black car culture. 
When Montgomery police pulled over black drivers, they did so by targeting 
a group, yet they questioned individuals and made individuals stop their 
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school to deny African Americans the freedom to break free from segregated school, spaces that the 
government, both state and municipal, dictated acceptable or unacceptable for black children. 
238A station wagon was the primary mode of transportation that got the nine children to school the 
first week, but eventually due to mass hostility from whites, the 101st airborne division was called in 
to escort the children to and within the school. Armed soldiers ensured the relative safety of the 
children, and their authority and weapons were largely what maintained that insurance. Mass 
carpooling could not provide that same level of safety once the children were inside the space of the 
school walls.  
239 Garrow, Bearing the Cross, 361. 
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automobiles. The automobile, by design, is geared toward individuality.240 An 
individual drives the car; an individual or at most a small group of individuals use 
the space within the vehicle while in operation, and police simply could not pull 
over a group of cars in any meaningful way.241 In this manner the car also became an 
extension of one’s individuality. Throughout the twentieth century African 
Americans used cars and customization to express their own individuality, but also 
to create a visual representation of their existence. 
While the black citizens of Montgomery successfully forced (largely through 
the efficient carpool system) the desegregation of the buses, they simultaneously 
made the car a symbol toward which whites and police could direct their anger and 
hatred. There is perhaps no better illustration of this than the incident of the 
motorcycle officer throwing acid on Reverend Lambert’s brand new Mercury.242 
Cars were given a deeper symbol of freedom by the boycotters, and also became a 
physical target for white frustration. Similarly, with the collapse of segregated 
transportation, black motorists became the subjects of directed white irritation as 
Montgomery officers continued to pull over black motorists for being black and 
driving cars.243 
Throughout the boycott police officers in Montgomery self reported pulling 
over black drivers due to their race, explicitly stating that they pulled over any cars 
“hauling negroes,” however the admittance of this practice existing was a rarity 
                                                        
240 John Heitmann, The Automobile and American Life (New York: McFarland, 2009), 4. 
241 Heitmann, The Automobile and American Life, 134. 
242 Assistant Chief H.E. Jackson to Chief G.J. Ruppenthal, “Acid Thrown on Car” December 18, 1956. 
(Rosa Parks Museum Archive) 
243 The Montgomery Police Department “Memo to Capt. Brown: Black Motorists” May 15, 1957. 
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following the Civil Rights Movement, and it is often difficult to demonstrate that any 
traffic stop was solely based on race.244 Regardless of the difficulty one does not 
have to look too hard to see that a pattern of police behavior emerged, and 
continues in present day. Montgomery police officers did not try to hide the fact that 
a black driver’s blackness was, in their minds, enough to justify pulling the driver 
over, recording their license, address, make and model of the car, questioning them 
and often times ticketing the driver and or placing them under arrest.245 This 
behavior became commonplace. And reactions to it could turn violent.   
In 1967 after a string of riots, the largest of which took place in Detroit, 
Michigan, President Lyndon B. Johnson established the Kerner Commission, led by 
Governor Otto Kerner Jr. of Illinois, and charged it with the task of determining the 
underlying causes of the riots. The Kerner Commission interviewed over 130 people 
and one of the most common complaints among the testimonials was police abuse of 
power, specifically, “the stoppage of Negroes on foot or in cars without obvious 
basis.”246 Police harassment was certainly nothing new, but stopping black drivers 
for being black was one of the latest evolutions in police regulation of black 
behavior.  
The commission did not address police traffic stops in their 
recommendations.247 The commission did however address rampant racism across 
the country stating, “Segregation and poverty have created in the racial ghetto a 
                                                        
244 Montgomery Police Department, “Memo to Solicitor Thetford: Investigation of the Boycott” 
January 4, 1956. (RPMA)  
245 The Montgomery Police Department “Memo to Solicitor Thetford” January 16th 1956. (RPMA) 
246 Kerner Commission “Report on the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders,” 1968.  
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destructive environment totally unknown to most white Americans.”248 The report 
continued explaining, “What white Americans have never fully understood but what 
the Negro can never forget—is that white society, is deeply implicated in the ghetto. 
White institutions created it, white institutions maintain it and white society 
condones it.”249 The white maintenance and condoning of systems that generate 
poverty among certain African American communities are behaviors that still need 
addressing. Racialized traffic stops, and violent racist dealings with African 
American motorists did not subside following the turbulent 60s, and riots continued 
to be a common response. Also continued was the “breaking up of street groups, 
indiscriminate stops and searches [which] is frequently directed at youths, creating 
special tensions in the ghetto where the average age is generally under 21.”250 It is of 
little wonder then why African American males under the age of twenty-one 
disproportionately make up the prison population. They are pulled over at higher 
rates, questioned at higher rates, and detained at higher rates so it should be no 
question then as to why they are convicted at higher rates.251 The automobile 
continued to be a space in which African Americans found themselves at the mercy 
of police action.252 
                                                        
248 Kerner Commission Report, 301 
249 Kerner Commission Report, 301-302 
250 Kerner Commission Report, 303. 
251 Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness (New York: 
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On March 3, 1991 Rodney King, a taxi driver in Los Angeles was driving home 
after drinking beers and watching a basketball game with friends. King was followed 
by police officers and attempted to evade them after they signaled for King to pull 
over. King led officers on a high-speed chase, and after being cornered, King and the 
other passengers were ordered out of the car. King’s passengers, Bryant Allen and 
Freddie Helms, were manhandled, racially taunted, kicked and stomped. King, with 
his hands up, was tazed by officers twice and then beaten by officers who kicked 
him and used batons to strike him multiple times.253  The majority of the attack was 
caught on camera by George Holiday, who upon seeing the incident from his house, 
grabbed his camera and filmed as five officers struck King over and over with their 
batons. The shaky, low-resolution video clearly shows officers hitting King in the 
legs, torso, back and head, while also repeatedly kicking King who slowly rolled on 
the ground. King was then placed in handcuffs, dragged to the side of the road, and 
finally put in the backseat of a patrol car.254 
King never demonstrated any resistance once emerging from the police car. 
Police never successfully documented any initial reason for attempting to pull King 
over in the first place, and while it was later discovered that King was in fact 
inebriated, officers were not aware of this while in pursuit of King. The officers that 
initially tried to pull King over explained that King was slightly speeding, although 
they had no evidence to substantiate their claims. He was yet another black driver 
                                                                                                                                                                     
profiling which was largely unreported by newspapers until the late 1980s and early 1990s. Likely 
oral history will play a major role in uncovering these stories.   
253 “Passenger Describes L.A. Police Department Beating of Driver, Calls it Racial,” The New York 
Times, March 21, 1991. 
254 George Holiday, “Rodney King Beating Video” www.rodenykingvideo.com accessed May 14, 2015. 
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pulled over for “suspicious behavior” which more often than not should be read as 
“being black.” King and his automobile, like the automobiles and carpoolers in 1956 
Montgomery, was guilty of driving while black. 
 The video was shown to the public by numerous television news stations, 
and resulted in the officers being brought to trial. The trial took place over a year 
after King’s beating and resulted in the exoneration of the five officers that beat 
King, sparking a wave of violence and riots in Los Angeles and surrounding areas, as 
well as some other major cities across the country.255 It was a rare moment. The 
beating of a black motorist was not a novel occurrence, nor were riots caused by 
racial tension, but Holiday’s capturing of the incident on film certainly was 
uncommon and placed police misconduct on national television showing the 
American public what the ramification can be for being black and driving an 
automobile.256 
The phenomenon of “driving while black” is much more commonplace than 
headlines of it are. In fact the practice is treated as a fact of life that African 
Americans are forced to live with. In a 1999 issue of Ebony, journalist Joy Bennett 
Kinnon tried to explain a wave of attacks on black motorists at the hands of police 
                                                        
255 Robert D. McFadden, “Riots in Los Angeles: Eruption; Some Violence on the Streets of New York,” 
The New York Times, May 2, 1992.  
256This points to another drastically important technological system in the history of black motorists’ 
encounters with police, and encounters with police in general: the handheld video camera. While it is 
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nonetheless a significant development in American culture and society, particularly in African 
American culture as nearly every modern reported police beating or shooting of African Americans 
that makes its way into mass news media is accompanied by film footage often recorded by the 
cellphones of onlookers. With widespread video coverage, abuses of power are continually being 
caught on tape, and thus hard evidence can be brought against the officers involved, seen by the 
American public, and credibility can be given to the claims of widespread racism. 
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officers, and included in the article a short public service announcement entitled, 
“What To Do If You Are Caught Driving While Black.”257 The suggestions were 
however not Kinnon’s creation but rather were produced by the NAACP, the 
National Organization of Black Law Enforcement Executives (NOBLE), and Allstate 
Insurance Foundation. Kinnon explained that the three organizations produced a 
pamphlet aimed at instructing, “young Blacks on their rights and how to avoid a 
situation that could escalate into brutality.”258 The suggestions include eight 
separate steps that include overtly calm and “polite” behavior, carrying a lawyer’s 
phone number, and consistent direct communication of one’s actions with the 
police. These are words that African American motorists must live by if they want to 
decrease their chances of violent altercations with police when in the midst of a 
traffic stop. These are not just unspoken rules, but now published guidelines that 
dictate social interaction, and are signifiers of minority motorists’ lack of power to 
change those rules. The fact that the NAACP, NOBLE, and particularly Allstate 
produced this pamphlet speaks to the pervasive nature of racism dictating the 
interaction of minority traffic stops. While NOBLE and the NAACP both focus their 
efforts on African American social issues, Allstate Insurance does not make a habit 
of addressing racism on the road. It is a sign that the company acknowledged that 
“driving while black” was significantly affecting a large portion of those insured by 
the company, and Allstate wanted those customers to know they were aware of the 
                                                        
257 Joy Bennett Kinnon, “DWB, Driving While Black: What’s Behind The Wave Of Attacks On Black 
Motorists?,” Ebony, September 1999, 66. 
258 Kinnon, “DWB, Driving While Black: What’s Behind The Wave Of Attacks On Black Motorists?,” 66. 
107 
 
 
 
 
practice and wanted to help assuage interactions between minority motorists and 
police. 
  Kinnon supplements the list ending the article with a quote from the 
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) stating, “No person of color is safe from this 
treatment anywhere, regardless of their obedience to the law, their age, the type of 
car they drive or their station in life. In short skin color has become evidence of the 
propensity to commit crime, and police use this ‘evidence’ against minority drivers 
on the road all the time.”259 The ACLU was well aware that minorities and whites 
operated under different social rules when interacting with police while on the road. 
The ACLU explicitly stated how often race was used as the motivating factor for 
traffic stops and ensuing brutality. With the advent of video cameras nearly 
everywhere, it is no surprise that the American media increasingly found stories and 
footage of the unfolding of “driving while black” instances. Indeed “waves” (as 
Kinnon called it) of these cases continued to be thrust into headlines.  
One of the latest cases of driving while black thrown to the front of media 
headlines came in April of 2015 when Walter Scott an African American motorist 
was stopped in his 1991 Mercedes by North Charleston police office Michael Slager 
for having his vehicle exhibiting a broken taillight. While broken taillights are not 
cause enough to make a traffic stop in North Charleston, South Carolina, officer 
Slager signaled Scott to pull over. Scott, who was heading to an auto parts store to 
fix his taillight, fled his vehicle after Slager’s initial contact.260 An onlooker captured 
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the event that followed on camera through the use of his smartphone. The video 
shows Scott running from Slager, and then the officer shooting Scott in the back 
eight times. Following the shooting, the officer can be seen calling the incident in, 
and while other officers arrive on seen, Slager drops a gun shaped object onto the 
body of Michael Scott.261 Slager later claimed that Scott attempted to grab the tazer 
secured on Slager’s belt, however in the video it appears as though the officer drops 
the tazer onto Scott’s body after shooting Scott and placing him in handcuffs.262 
Scott was yet another victim guilty of driving while black, and Slager yet another 
officer who, because of Scott’s skin color, chose to pull a black driver over. This is 
the pattern that can be seen amongst the traffic stops in Montgomery during the 
boycott, the stop of King, and countless other cases since the bus boycott: black 
drivers pulled over, and the encounter ranging from minor secondary charges to 
police shootings of the driver. The pattern continues. 
While it is certainly not the historian’s job to predict or create solutions for 
the problems that grip the past, and often the present, there is one suggestion that 
must be made. The United States would do well to remember the advice given by the 
Kerner Commission. To deny the existence of widespread cyclical patterns and 
presences of racism is to deny history. Too often are repudiations of racial problems 
heard through the halls of even the highest learning institutions and from those with 
the highest degrees in their field. Racism today exists in more subtle forms than in 
the early twentieth century. It is not as blatantly obvious as a streetcar operator 
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abusing black passengers while yelling racial epithets; not as obvious as a bus driver 
demanding that black passengers move to the back of the bus. Instead it goes unsaid 
and unpronounced. It is no longer as Martin Luther King Jr. put it, “dripping” from 
southern mouths.263 Instead it can be heard muffled through words like “thug” and 
“hoodlum.” In the wake of the riots that broke out in Baltimore in April of 2015, in 
an interview on CNN, Baltimore City Councilman Carl Stokes voiced his frustration 
over hidden yet ubiquitous racism explaining, “Of course its not the right word to 
call our children thugs. These are children who have been set aside, marginalized, 
who have not been engaged by us. No we do not have to call them thugs….So calling 
them thugs, just call them niggers.”264 Similarly it is unlikely that police officers 
make conscious decisions based upon race when pulling over automobiles operated 
by African Americans, however racial bias and tension is still at play.  
In 1956 Montgomery, it was clear that officers thought, “they are black, I will 
pull them over,” but as time progressed the word black became substituted for the 
word suspicious in justifying police interactions with black motorists. Often racism 
has bled unknowingly into individual and communal perceptions of people and 
cultures, and there become two victims of racism: those who it is directed at, and 
those who fall prey to its grip. Rarely are children raised as they once were to 
consciously hate African Americans. Instead racism is passed on through depictions 
in the media, through honest misconceptions about groups of people, through 
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264 Carl Stokes, interview by Erin Burnett, CNN, April 28, 2015. 
110 
 
 
 
 
subtlety.265 The Subject of race makes people afraid, but it cannot be avoided. It has 
not died off due to ignoring it.  
The story of black automobility is an unfinished one, with much left to 
uncover and still much more to be written, however from the pieces known, 
knowledge can be gleaned. Through pooling resources African Americans gained an 
immense amount of power found in the changing of social rules of interaction. 
African American jitney owners and operators forced jitney corporations and white 
supremacists to restructure laws, and however brief, provided African Americans a 
viable option for avoiding the hostile spaces of segregated public transportation. 
Black carpoolers through constructing an efficient means of boycotting the 
segregated buses similarly established a system that empowered black passengers, 
drivers, business owners, and laborers. The carpools were the key to changing the 
rules that regulated the social life of public transportation in Montgomery, Alabama. 
Unknowingly they also changed the rules that established social interactions 
between black motorists and police; rules that still linger. As is all too common 
though, there are still many gaps to be filled. The job of the historian is yet again 
unfinished, and this study is merely a mile marker. The intersection of race and the 
technological system of the automobile is an important one, with long lasting 
impacts across a range of cultural and social understandings and just as the 
automobile has been a tool in reshaping the physical, economic, political, and 
cultural structures of the world, it has similarly reshaped the many nuances of racial 
interactions.  
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